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SUMMARY 
The reliability of the Federally Owned Water Main (FOWM) system was 
examined, and recommendations to improve system reliability are made. The 
existing FOWM system is very dependent upon three different pipe links. The 
first and most important link is the Francis Scott Key Bridge river crossing. 
This link carries the entire FOWM supply, and if taken out of service, an 
alternate means of supply must be used. At present, the only alternate source 
of supply is through interconnections with the adjacent Arlington County, 
Virginia, system. 
The second vital link is the 30-in. steel main which extends from the 
Key Bridge river crossing to the Pentagon. This line carries approximately 
83 percent of the total delivery to the FOWM system. If taken out of service, 
all flow in the FOWM system would have to be routed through the 16-in. main 
along George Washington Parkway and Eisenhower Drive. During periods of high 
water use, flow in this 16-in. line would cause excessive friction losses. As 
a result, adequate system pressures cannot be maintained, and system demands 
cannot be fully met. 
The final critical pipe link is the feed to National Airport. This link 
consists of a 24-in. pipe and a 16-in. pipe connected in series. At present, 
this is the only source of water for National Airport. If this line were 
taken out of service, an alternate source of supply must be found. Further-
more, the available fire flow to the airport through this line during maximum 
daily demands falls below Insurance Services Office requirements. 
Several system improvements were evaluated to determine their contribu-
tion to the overall reliability of the FOWM system. System improvements con-
sisted of operating existing and new interconnections, constructing new river 
crossings, installing a new storage tank, new line construction, and combina-
tions of the above. System improvements were evaluated and ranked based on 
hydraulic performance, engineering impact, and total cost. 
The tabulation on page 3 shows a ranking of the proposed sys tem improve-
ments. Although it is the most costly, the reliability of the FOWM system can 
be greatly increased by constructing a new river crossing across the 
14th Street Bridge and installing a new line from the Pentagon to Washington 
National Airport. Implementing these improvements will double the r edundancy 
of the system and allow the FOWM system to "stand alone" and not rely on 
1 
adjacent systems for proper operation during emergencies. Furthermore, if 
this combined alternative is connected to the Arlingt on Count y Third Gravity 
pressure zone, significant energy savings plus an increase in Arlington County 
reliability could be realized. 
In addition t o the recommendation made above, two other projects should 
be seriously considered. The 16-in. pipe loop around the Pentagon is discon-
nected around the eastern face of the building. This line should be repaired 
or replaced so tha t the loop around the Pentagon is complete. Also, an 8-in. 
National Airport i nterconnection should be repaired or replaced to provide the 
a irport with at least two sources of supply. 
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Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
* E -
VG -
G -
F -
p 
-
** See 
Recommendations to Improve FOWM Reliability 
Alternative 
14th Street Bridge River Crossing 
and New Airport Feed 
Booster Pump Off Low Service 
and New Airport Feed 
14th Street Bridge River Crossing only 
New Airport Feed only 
Booster Pump Off Low Service only 
Roosevelt Bridge River Crossing 
and paralleling 30-in. main 
Roosevelt Bridge River Crossing 
Paralleling 30-in. Main 
Subaqueous River Crossing 
Existing Interconnections 
excellent 
very good 
good 
fai r 
poor 
Table 10. 
Hydraulic 
Performance* 
E 
VG 
VG 
VG 
G-VG 
G-VG 
G 
G 
G 
p 
Engineering 
Impact** 
14 
15 
8 
6 
9 
14 
8 
6 
10 
10 
t Does not include O&M cos t s . 
Total Capital 
Costs 
(thousands of dollars) 
13,331 
10,979t 
10,990 
2,341 
8, 638 t 
11.,191 
9,750 
1,441 
8,948 
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PREFACE 
This report describes a study conducted by the US Army Engineer Water-
ways Experiment Station (WES) for the US Army Engineer District (USAED), 
Baltimore, Washington Aqueduct Division (WAD). 
The work was conducted at the WES, and the Universi ty of Kentucky (UK) 
Civil Engineering Department. The report was written by Mr. Donald V. Chase, 
Water Resources Engineering Group (WREG), Environmental Engineering Division 
(EED), Environmental Laboratory (EL), WES; Dr. Lindell E. Ormsbee, Assistant 
Professor of civil engineering at UK working with WES under an Intergovern-
mental Personnel Act agreement; and Dr. Thomas M. Walski, Research Civil 
Engineer, WREG. At the time this study was performed, Mr. Chase was a grad-
uate student at UK. Mr . Wayne W. Sharp of the WREG assisted in the field data 
collection. The report was edi ted by Mr. Bobby Odom, assigned to the Informa-
tion Technology Laboratory under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act. 
Work done for WAD of the USAED, Baltimore, was performed under the pur-
view of Mr. Harry C. Ways, Chief, WAD; Mr . Perry Cos tas, Assistant Chief, WAD; 
and Mr. Pete Peterson, Chief, Engineering Branch, WAD. The report was 
reviewed by Drs. Paul Schroeder and Douglas Shields, WREG. The study was con-
ducted under the supervision of Dr. Schroeder, Acting Chief, WREG; 
Dr. Raymond L. Montgomery , Chief, EED; and Dr. John Harrison, Chief, EL. 
COL Dwayne G. Lee, EN, is Commander and Director of WES. Dr. Robert W. 
Whalin is Technical Director. 
This report should be cited as follows: 
Chase, Donald V., Ormsbee, Lindell E. , and Walski, Thomas M. 1988. 
"Reliability of the Federally Owned Water Main System," Technical Report 
EL-88-18, US Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, MS. 
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CONVERSION FACTORS, NON-SI TO SI (METRIC) 
UNITS OF MEASUREMENT 
Non-SI units of measurement used in this report can be converted to SI (met-
ric) units as follows: 
Multiply 
feet 
gallons (US liquid) 
horsepower (550 foot-pounds 
(force) per second) 
inches 
miles (US statute) 
pounds (force) per square inch 
7 
By 
0.3048 
3.785412 
745.6999 
2.54 
1.609347 
6.894757 
To Obtain 
metres 
cubic decimetres 
watts 
centimetres 
kilometres 
kilopascals 
RELIABILITY FOR THE FEDERALLY OWNED WATER MAIN SYSTEM 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
Background 
1. The Federally Owned Water Main (FOWM) distribution system serves 
Federal facilities in the northern section of Arlington County, Virgi~ia. 
Among the facilities served by the system are the Pentagon, Washington 
National Airport, the Navy Annex, Arlington National Cemetery, Fort Myer, and 
the Pentagon heating plant. The FOWM system is operated and maintained by the 
Washington Aqueduct Division (WAD) of the US Army Engineer District, 
Baltimore. 
2. The FOWM system is supplied from the Washington, DC, water distribu-
tion system via two water mains. The two lines, a 30-in.* line and a 16-in. 
line, cross the Potomac River at Key Bridge. Failure of one of these mains 
recently raised concern for the reliability of the overall system. In case of 
an emergency, the FOWM system can be served through interconnections wit h the 
Arlington County, Virginia, water system. However, the operational impact of 
such an arrangement on the FOWM and Arlington County systems has not been 
fully investigated. 
3. The condition of the FOWM system has been addressed in a previous 
study "Analysis of Federally Owned Water Main System" (Walski 1984). This 
study analyzed the system in terms of pipe outage and evaluated the pressures 
and flows in the FOWM system for several emergency conditions. Due to their 
condition, several lines were determined to be very susceptible to breakage. 
Furthermore, in the event of a failure of the 30-in. supply line, the fire-
fighting capacity of the system could not be maintained without opening one or 
more connections with the Arlington County system. The impact of the opera-
tion of these interconnections on the extended performance of both systems was 
not investigated in the previous study. 
* A table of factors for converting non-SI units of measurement to SI 
(metric) units is presented on page 7. 
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Purpose 
4. The purpose of this report was to evaluate the reliability of the 
existing FOWM system with a special emphasis on possible long-term outages. 
Several alternatives for improving the system reliability were investigated. 
These alternatives include new pipeline construction within the FOWM system, 
new river crossings between FOWM and the Washington, DC, system, a new storage 
tank, new interconnections between FOWM and Arlington County, and the use of 
existing interconnections. Hydraulic, economic, and environmental analyses of 
each alternative were performed. The operational impact of the new and exist-
ing interconnections on the extended performance of both the FOWM and Arling-
ton syste~s was also evaluated. 
Overview 
5. A mathematical model of the FOWM system and neighboring Arlington 
County system was constructed using information supplied by Washington Aque-
duct and Arlington County officials . The model was calibrated using data 
gathered during fire hydrant flow tests on each of the systems. Calibration 
was accomplished by adjusting pipe roughness and water usage within prescribed 
boundaries until predicted heads matched those observed in the field. 
6. The performance of the existing FOWM system was evaluated under a 
series of loading conditions. Loadings included average daily demand, maximum 
daily demand, peak hourly demand, and fire demands. The existing system was 
then evaluated under the same loading conditions for several pipe outages. 
This identified key mains which when placed out of service would adversely 
affect the performance of the FOWM system. 
7. Several alternatives designed to improve the performance of the FOWM 
system were evaluated under the same loading conditions and pipe outages as 
the existing system. The evaluation consisted of a hydraulic and engineering 
assessment as well as an economic assessment. Recommendations designed t o 
improve the reliability of the FOWM system were made based on the results of 
the hydraulic, engineering, and economic evaluations. 
9 
PART II: STUDY AREA 
Washington, DC, System 
8. The WAD of the Corps of Engineers (CE) has the responsibility of 
securing, treating, and supplying water to Washington, DC (hereafter referred 
to as DC). This is accomplished through the use of two water treatment plants 
(Dalecarlia and McMillan), both of which receive their raw water from the 
Potomac River. In addition to supplying water to DC, the Washington Aqueduct 
also supplies water to the FOWM system, Arlington County and Falls Church, 
Virginia . 
9 . Distribution of finished water to consumers in DC and areas east of 
the Anacostic River is the pr imary responsibility of the Water and Sewer Util-
ity Administration (WSUA) of the DC Department of Public Works. Pumping of 
t he finished water is the responsibility of both the WAD of the CE and WSUA. 
The major pumping stations of the syst em are the Dalecarlia Pump Station (CE) 
and the Bryant Street Pump Station (WSUA). 
10. Ground elevations in DC and vicinity vary from <7 ft to 420 ft mean 
sea level (MSL) . To provide average water pressure of about SO psi over this 
altitude range, the city is divided into seven pressure zones: (a) Low, 
(b) First High, (c) Second High, (d) Third High, (e) Fourth High, (f) Ana-
costia First High, and (g) Anacostia Second High. Each pressure zone com-
prises a certain range of ground elevations. The pressure in each of these 
service areas is controlled to maintain a range of 40 t o 80 psi, depending 
upon whether a given location is near the upper or lower boundary of the ser-
vice area. A schematic of the DC service area is shown in Figure 1. 
FOWM System 
11 . The FOWM system is supplied from the First High pressure zone of 
the DC distribution system. FOWM is connected to the DC system via a 30-in. 
and a 16-in. transmission main suspended beneath the Francis Scott Key Bridge 
(hereafter called Key Bridge). This is the only direct link between the FOWM 
system and the DC system. In t he event of an emergency, FOWM must be supplied 
from the Arlington County distribution system through a series of emergency 
interconnections. 
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12. The FOWM transmission and distribution system contains approxi-
mately 25 miles of water main. Pipe sizes range from 1.25 to 30 in. Nearly 
all of this length was laid in the late 1930's and early 1940's when the Pen-
tagon and Washington National Airport were constructed. As a result, most of 
the lines in the FOWM system are unlined cast iron with an average age of 40 
to 50 years. 
13. As part of the previous study on the system (Walski 1984), most of 
the mains in the FOWM system were found to be in generally good condition. 
However, several mains were identified as having high breakage rates and 
requiring some type of corrective action. The first of these mains is the 
16- in. Pentagon loop which runs from the 30-in. steel line in the Pentagon 
11 
north parking mall, along the north, east, and south face s of the Pentagon to 
the 24-in. pipe at the southwest corner of the building. Most of the problems 
with this line are corrosion-related. 
the Pentagon was originally marshland. 
The area between the Potomac River and 
Fill has been placed in this area to 
provide a foundation for buildings and roadways. Previous soils investiga-
tions in the area have revealed that the soil is corrosive and therefore 
aggressive to the uncoated 16-in. line (Page 1983). 
14. The condition of the 16-in. line circling the Pentagon is further 
aggravated by the fact that a portion of this line is not in service. A sec-
tion of the line along the eastern face of the Pentagon was crushed, and as a 
result, approximately 1,100 ft of this loop has been taken out of service. 
15. A second pipeline found to be in questionable condition is the 
24-in . main west of the Pentagon from the 30-in. steel main in the Pentagon 
north parking mall to 15th and Eads Streets. Most of the breaks in this line 
were lead joint leaks attributed to poor jointing or bedding or inadequate 
thrust restraint. 
16. The 6-in. pipe supplying the Pentagon heating plant was also iden-
tified as having a large number of main breaks. This line runs from an inter-
connection with Arlington County east of I-95, underneath the interstate, to 
the heating plant. Road construction in the area may have been responsible 
for the high number of pipe breaks in this line. 
17. The previous report identified a potential problem area where the 
30-in. steel main lies close to the Metro tracks. Frequently such systems 
have stray d-e current which can cause serious corrosion problems. The 30-in. 
main is vital to normal operation of the FOWM system, and corrosion to the 
line could result in this link being placed out of service. 
18. Storage for the FOWM system is provided by the Foxhall Reservoir, a 
14.5-MG underground facility, and Soldiers Home Reservoir, a 15-MG storage 
facility. Since Foxhall Reservoir is three times closer to the FOVlM system 
than the Soldiers Rome facility, the Foxhall Reservoir is the controlling tank 
for the FOWM system. However, there is no storage south of the Potomac River 
within FOWM itself. 
19. In the event of an emergency, FOWM can be fed from Arlington 
County, Virginia, through a series of emergency interconnections. There are 
seven existing interconnections between the FOWM and the Arlington County sys-
tems. These interconnections can be used to help supply water from one system 
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to the other in the event of a major line failure or large fire. The loca-
tions of the interconnections and the connecting pressure zones are shown in 
Figure 2. Note that the FOWM system and Gravity Three pressure zones have the 
same operating grades and elevations and therefore do not require pressure 
reducing values (PRV's) as part of the interconnections. 
Arlington County System 
20. Arlington County is served from the Dalecarlia Pump Station via a 
24-in. and a 36-in. transmission main extending from the pump station to Chain 
Bridge. The bridge c r ossing consists of a manifold on both sides of the Poto-
mac River with three 20-in. mains suspended from beneath the bridge. A 48-in. 
line in the immediate vicinity crosses underneath the river parallel to the 
bridge. 
21. The Arlington County transmiss ion and distribution system consists 
of over 430 miles of water main ranging in size from 4 to 36 in. Approxi-
mately 16 percent of the mileage is composed of 12-in. and larger mains. The 
majority of the lines in Arlington County have been installed s ince 1927 with 
major periods of expansion occurring during the 1940's and 1960's. Pipe mate-
rial is either cast iron, ductile iron with cement lining , or concrete pres-
sure pipe. Most lines laid prior to 1960 are cast iron. 
22. At present Arlington County has seven separate pressure zones: 
(a) Gravity One, (b) Gravity Two, (c) Gravity Three, (d) Reservoir, (e) Lee-
Minor Hill, (f) Rosslyn, and (g) Willston. A map of the county is provided in 
Figure 3. Since elevations in Reservoir and Lee-Minor Hill are greater than 
those in Gravity One, pumping is required from Gravity One to Reservoir and 
from Gravity One to Lee-Minor Hill. Water must flow through PRV 's from Grav-
ity One to Gravity Two, Rosslyn, and Gravity Three since Gravity One is at a 
higher elevation than the other zones. The PRV's have been placed in the 
major transmission lines in order to separate the system into various pressure 
zones. As shown in Figure 3, the Gravity One, Gravity Two, Gravity Three, and 
Rosslyn pressure zones provide a boundary between the Arlington County and 
FOWM water distribution systems. 
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PART III: DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPUTER MODEL 
Computer Model 
23. Analyzing the operation of a water distribution system under both 
normal and emergency operating conditions is a complex problem. Directly 
testing the response of the system to a component failure by shutting down 
part of the system would disrupt service. As a result, it is necessary to 
simulate such activities with a computer program. For this study, the FOWM 
water distribution system was evaluated using the KYPIPE (Wood 1980) computer 
simulation program. 
System Schematic 
24. Before the computer program can be applied, a schematic of the net-
work must first be developed. The schematic is a diagram which illustrates 
the network through the use of circles and line segments. Each line segment 
corresponds to an individual pipe in the distribution system. Each circle 
corresponds to the intersection of two or more pipes. These intersection 
points are called nodes. 
25. In computer modeling it is usually not necessary to include every 
pipe in the distribution system. Instead, it is possible to analyze a skele-
tal system which includes only the major mains but still produces accurate 
results because the mains not included in the skeletonized system do not carry 
a great deal of flow. 
System Description 
26. Before a computer program, such as KYPIPE, can be used to simulate 
a distribution system, a decision must be made concerning the scope of the 
modeling effort. Because the FOWM system is served from the DC system and 
since several existing interconnections between FOWM and the Arlington County 
system are available for use, both the DC and Arlington systems were included 
in the analysis. Descriptions of the skeletal systems derived for each of the 
major components of the study are provided below. 
16 
FOWM system 
27. The FOWM system is supplied from the DC First High pressure zone. 
Water is delivered to users in the FOWM system through a 30-in. main and a 
16-in. main suspended beneath Key Bridge. The two lines run parallel to each 
other from Key Bridge along the George Washington Memorial Parkway to the 
George Washington Parkway and US Highway 66 interchange. Here, the lines turn 
southwest a short distance to a point just north of Jefferson Davis Highway 
and Marshall Drive. At this location, the two lines diverge with the 30-in. 
steel line paralleling Jefferson Davis Highway to the Pentagon, and the 16-in. 
pipe paralleling Eisenhower Drive to the Navy Annex. 
28 . At the Pentagon, the 30-in. line branches into a 16-in. line and a 
24-in. line. The 16-in. line runs north, east, and south around the Pentagon 
while the 24-in. pipe runs along the western face of the building. At the 
northwest corner of the Pentagon south parking lot, the two mains join to 
complete the loop around the Pentagon. At present, however, the loop is not 
closed since a segment of the 16-in. main along the eastern face of the build-
ing was crushed and taken out of service. 
29. The 16-in. transmission main runs parallel to Eisenhower Drive up 
to a point between Patton Drive and Columbia Pike. At this location, the 
16-in. line branches to a 10-in. pipe, which feeds the Navy Annex and 
Henderson Hall, and a 12-in. line. The 12-in. line runs parallel to I-95 a 
short distance to the southwest corner of the Pentagon south parking lot. 
30. At this corner, an 18-in. pipeline connects the Pentagon loop and 
the 12-in. line from the Navy Annex. This line runs along the western 
boundary of the Pentagon south parking lot. At this point, the 12-in. line 
from the Navy Annex and the 18-in. line from the Pentagon join to a single 
24-in. line which runs from the southwest corner of the Pentagon south parking 
lot to an interconnection with Arlington County at 15th and Eads Streets. A 
single 16-in. pipe runs from the 15th and Eads interconnection to Washington 
National Airport. At present the 24- and 16-in. lines form the only feed for 
the airport. A schematic of the FOWM system is shown in Figure 4 . 
Arlington system 
31. Arlington County is supplied from the DC Third High pressure zone 
through the Chain Bridge river crossing. The river crossing consists of three 
20-in. mains suspended beneath the bridge and a 48-in. subaqueous main cross-
ing parallel to the bridge. The 48-in. subaqueous river crossing failed in 
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Figure 4. Schematic of FOWM service area 
11 July 1986 and was put back in service in the spring of 1988. On the 
Virginia side of the Potomac River, the system branches into an intricate 
network of pipes, tanks, and booster pumps supplying the seven different 
pressure zones in Arlington County. 
. . 
32. Because existing or potential interconnections with FOWM exist in 
four of the pressure zones, each of these zones was also included in the anal-
ysis. These zones include First Gravity, Second Gravity, Third Gravity, and 
Rosslyn. Since the Reservoir, Minor Hill, and Willston pressure zones do not 
directly impact the FOWM sys tem, the demands for these systems were treated as 
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single demands in the First Gravity pressure zone. The schematic of the 
Arlington system is shown in Figure 5. Only the junction nodes of special 
interest are highlighted in the schematic. 
DC system 
33. Because FOWM is supplied from the First High pressure zone and the 
Arlington County system is supplied from the Third High pressure zone, both 
the First and Third High pressure zones were included in the analysis. In 
developing skeletonized networks for both the First and Third High pressure 
zones, only the Dalecarlia Pump Station was included. The Bryant Street Pump 
Station was not directly considered. Instead, the total system demands for 
both pressure zones were adjusted to account for the contribution of the 
Bryant Street Pump Station. 
34. In developing a skeletonized network for the First High pressure 
zone, only the pipes connecting the Dalecarlia Pump Station with the FOWM sys-
tem were included. Soldiers Home Reservoir and the Bryant Street Pump Station 
were not included in the analysis because these facilities are three times 
further away from the FOWM system than Foxhall Reservoir and Dalecarlia Pump 
Station. Furthermore, the only location between the Dalecarlia Pump Station 
and the First High pressure zone where water is withdrawn from the First High 
system is at Key Bridge where water is delivered to the FOWM system. As a 
result, Foxhall and Dalecarlia will control the hydraulics of the FOWM system. 
The schematic for the First High pressure zone is shown in Figure 6. 
35. In developing a skeletonized network for the Third High pressure 
zone, only the pipes influencing the Arlington County system were cons idered. 
This included the lines from the Dalecarlia Pump Station t o the Arlington sys-
tem and the lines from the Dalecarlia Pump Station to the Third High Reser-
voir. The schematic for the Third High pressure zone is shown in Figure 7. 
36. One potential alternative to improve FOWM system reliability is to 
construct a booster pump station from the DC Low pressure zone to the FOWM 
system. Water would be carried from the Low service area, across the Potomac 
River, to the FOWM system. This requires that the DC Low pressure zone be 
included in the analysis as well. Unlike the First and Third High pressure 
zones, both the Dalecarlia and Bryant Street Pump Stations will be included in 
the skeletonalized network since the proposed booster pump s tation is located 
midway between the two pump stations. The schematic for the Low service pres-
sure zone is shown in Figure 8. 
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37. Once a network schematic of the system has been developed, a data 
base must be established. The required data base includes information on each 
pipe and node as well as information on all pumps, tanks, and valves. In 
addition, the demands associated with the various nodes must be determined. 
Pipe data 
38. Maps showing the location of all mains in the system were obtained 
from officials with WAD and Arlington County. Those pipes to be included in 
the model were then selected based on size and importance. Nodes were placed 
at all locations where two or more pipes joined together. Lengths between 
nodes were scaled off the maps and recorded. Roughness values were determined 
23 
by field tests and calibration analysis. The complete set of pipe data used 
in the analysis is shown in Appendix A. 
Node data 
39. Nodes were placed at locations where two or more mains join together. 
Junction data requirements included elevation and water use. Elevations for 
nodes located in the FOWM system were found from field surveys or determined 
using maps obtained from the CE. Elevations for nodes in Arlington County 
were found from field surveys. 
40 . Water consumption for the study area was estimated from historical 
operating records for the 1985 fiscal year. A summary of the average daily 
demand for each service area is shown in Table l. 
41. In reality, water is withdrawn from a particular water main at 
various service connections which are located along the entire length of the 
pipe. However, when modeling a distribution system on a computer, these 
demands are concentrated at individual nodes. The demands along the pipe are 
aggregated at certain nodes which are in the immediate vicinity of the water 
withdrawal. For example, water used at Fort Myer is withdrawn from various 
points within the Fort Myer complex. However, for purposes of computer 
Service Area 
Low (including Anacostia) 
First High (including FOWM) 
Table l 
Average Daily Demands 
Second High (including Falls Church) 
Third High (including Fourth High and Arlington) 
Total 
FOWM 
Arlington 
Falls Church 
Remainder of Washington, DC 
Total 
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Average Demand, mgd 
72.5 
38.7 
39 . 8 
64.6 
215.6 
3.2 
23.3 
16.0 
173.1 
215.6 
analysis, the entire Fort Myer water demand is placed at one node located at 
the entrance of the facility. 
42. In modeling the distribution system, the average daily demand for 
each service area was distributed among several nodes in each particular 
system. The selection of the demand nodes and the amount of water distributed 
to each node were based on an evaluation of the major users in each service 
area as described below. 
43. For the FOWM system, demands were placed at nodes corresponding to 
the locations of the following major users: (a) the Pentagon, (b) the Penta-
gon heating plant, (c) the Navy Annex, (d) Henderson Hall, (e) Fort Myer, 
(f) Arlington National Cemetery, and (g) National Airport. The demands and 
nodes associated with each of these locations are shown in Appendix A. 
44. Water use for the Arlington sys tem was placed at nodes correspond-
ing to the intersections of large mains or in areas of high building concen-
tration such as Crystal City. The junction data for the Arlington system are 
shown in Appendix A. 
45. For demands within the DC Low, First High, and Third High pressure 
zones, all water withdrawal was concentrated at several nodes in each network 
schematic. For the First High and Third High pressure zones, the distribution 
of demands within the pressure zones was not considered since FOWM and Arling-
ton County are located between Dalecarlia Pump Station and the major water 
users in First High and Third High. As a result, only the magnitude of water 
used, not the distribution of water, in First High and Third High will affect 
the hydraulics of the sys tem. On the other hand, the distribution of water 
usage in the Low service area is considered since the proposed FOWM load will 
be located on the boundary of the service area, midway between the two pump 
stations. The node data associated with each pressure zone are s hown in 
Appendix A. 
Pump data 
46. For this study, only the Dalecarlia pumps supplying the DC First 
and Third High pressure zones were included in the analysis. For the Low 
service zone, both pump stations were included in the analysis. The remaining 
pressure zones, however, were not included since they do not supply either the 
FOWM or Arlington County systems or are not included as part of a reliability-
improving alternative. 
47 . Three 500-hp pumps at the Dalecarlia Pump Station and three 325-hp 
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pumps at the Bryant Street Pump Station supply the DC Low service area. At 
the Dalecarlia facility, three 1,000-hp pumps supply the First High zone while 
six 1,590-hp pumps supply the Third High zone. Since all demands in FOWM and 
Arlington County are supplied by the Dalecarlia Pump Station, the First High 
and Third High pumps at the Bryant Street facility were not considered. The 
characteristic curves for the three sets of pumps are shown in Figures 9-11. 
Tank data 
48. Six different tanks were included in the computer analysis: 
Brentwood Reservoir in the Low s ervice area, Foxhall tank in the First High 
pressure zone, the old and new Reno tanks in the Third High pressure zone, and 
the two tanks at Fort Barnard in Arlington. One of the tanks at Fort Barnard 
serves the Third Gravity pressure zone while the other tank serves the Second 
Gravity pressure zone. A description of each tank is provided in Table 2. 
PRV data 
49. The Arlington County system contains 11 PRV's. Three valves are 
used to separate First Gravity from Second Gravity and four valves are used to 
separate First Gravity from Rosslyn. The remaining four valves are used to 
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30 
30 
Service Area 
Low 
First High 
Third High 
Arlington Second Gravity 
Arlington Third Gravity 
Table 2 
Tank Data 
Location 
Brentwood Park 
Foxhall Rd. NW 
New Reno NW 
Old Reno NW 
Fort Barnard 
Fort Barnard 
Capacity Max Min 
MG el* el 
25.0 172 135 
14.5 250 233 
20.0 424 406 
5.4 424 406 
0.5 300 275 
1.5 216 191 
* All elevations (el) cited herein are in feet referred to the National Geo-
detic Vertical Datum (NGVD). 
separate Second Gravity from Third Gravity. Table 3 delineates the location 
and setting of these valves. 
System Calibration 
SO. When utilizing a computer simulation model in distribution system 
analysis, it is imperative that the mathematical model of the system be an 
accurate representation of actual field conditions. If this is not the case, 
the results will be of limited value. Therefore, the model must be 
calibrated. System calibration may be accomplished by adjusting both water 
usage and pipe roughness until predicted heads and flows match those observed 
from field measurements. 
51. One common method for obtaining calibration data is to conduct fire 
hydrant flow tests at various locations throughout the system. Fire flow 
tests provide hydraulic information (pressures and flows) regarding both 
static and dynamic conditions. This information can be used with the computer 
model of the network to calibrate the system. 
52. Two different data sets were used in calibrating the network model. 
The first data set was obtained during the previous FOWM study (Walski 1984). 
This data set includes the results from several fire flow tests conducted in 
the FOWM system. The results of these fire flow tests are provided in 
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PRV Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Table 3 
PRV Data 
Location 
Second Gravity 
Washington Blvd . and Arlington Blvd. 
Fillmore St . and 1st St . 
Arlington Blvd. and Hudson St. 
Rosslyn 
Lee Highway and Veitch St. 
Key Blvd. and N Troy St . 
16th St. and N Troy St. 
N Courthouse Rd. and 13th St. 
Third Gravity 
Army-Navy Dr. and Lynn St. 
Lynn St. and 16th Street S 
Four Mile Run Dr. and Walter Reed Dr. 
31st St. and Randolph St . 
Grade Setting, ft 
346 
348 
352 
320 
320 
320 
320 
203 
198 
195 
202 
Table 4. The second data set includes the results of several fire flow tP,sts 
conducted in both the Arlington and FOWM systems in March 1987. The results 
of these fire flow tests are provided in Table 5. 
53. System calibration was performed using a nonlinear optimization 
technique developed by two of the authors (Ormsbee and Chase 1988). This 
technique systematically adjusts roughness coefficients, junction demands, and 
PRV settings within defined limits until the difference between observed and 
predicted heads was minimized. The technique allows the adjusted parameters 
(roughness coefficient, junction demand, and PRV setting) to be constrained 
based on knowledge of the system. Table 6 provides a comparison of the 
observed and predicted pressures after calibration. The calibrated roughness 
coefficients (C-factor) and water usage are shown in Appendix A. 
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Table 4 
Fire Test Results for FOWM System 
Hydrant Hydrant 
Test Elevation Pressure Discharge Pressure 
Number Location ft psi gpm psi 
1 Meter vault below 9 100 --
Key Bridge 
2 Park Service hose bib 30 92 
3 Along Metro 25 93 --
4 Pentagon north parking 48 83 1,300 78 
5 South side Pentagon 34 92 1,140 85 
6 Riverside parking lot 12 95 1,620 65 
7 Pentagon heating plant 12 98 800 68 
8 National Airport 20 95 1,140 80 
9 National Airport 18 89 --
South terminal 
10 Navy Annex 150 62 650 45 
11 H & S Headquarters 150 60-80 --
12 Arlington Cemetery 48 82 --
Visitors Center 
13 Lee Mansion 210 47 440 25 
30 
Table 5 
Fire Test Results for Arlington System 
Hydrant 
Test Hydrant Elevation 
Number Location ft 
1* 15th and Fern St. 42 
2* 15th and Fern St. 42 
3** 15th and Fern St. 42 
4** 15th and Fern St. 42 
5 Washington Blvd. and 207 
Wayne St. 
6 Washington Blvd. and 207 
Wayne St. 
7 Columbia Pike at 142 
Navy Annex 
8 Columbia Pike at 142 
Navy Annex 
* 15th and Eads Interconnection open. 
** 15th and Eads Interconnection closed. 
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Hydrant 
Pressure Discharge 
psi gpm 
80 
78 1,332 
72 --
64 1,267 
83 
70 1,300 
85 
65 978 
Hydrant 
Pressure 
psi 
--
63 
--
57 
--
60 
--
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Table 6 
Calibration Results 
Location 
Observed 
Pressure 
psi 
FOWM System 
Meter vaul t below 
Key Bridge 
Along Metro 
Riverside parking lot 
Hydrant discharge - 0 gpm 
Hydrant discharge - 1,620 gpm 
National Airport 
Hydrant discharge - 0 gpm 
Hydrant discharge 
- 1,140 gpm 
Arlington Cemetery 
Visitors Center 
Arlington County 
15th and Fern St .* 
Hydrant discharge - 0 gpm 
Hydrant discharge - 1,332 gpm 
15th and Fern St.** 
Hydrant discharge - 0 gpm 
Hydrant discharge - 1,268 gpm 
Washington Blvd. and Wayne St . 
Hydrant discharge - 0 gpm 
Hydrant discharge = 1,300 gpm 
Columbia Pike at Navy Annex 
Hydrant discharge - 0 gpm 
Hydrant discharge = 978 gpm 
* 15th and Eads Interconnection open. 
** 15th and Eads Interconnection closed. 
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100 
93 
95 
65 
95 
80 
82 
System 
80 
78 
72 
64 
83 
70 
85 
65 
Predicted 
Pressure 
psi 
97 
95 
98 
65 
89 
81 
77 
73 
71 
69 
67 
80 
74 
87 
69 
PART IV: HYDRAULIC ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING SYSTEM 
Evaluation Criteria 
54. In order to properly analyze the effectiveness of an existing water 
system, certain evaluation criteria which are indicative of a properly sized 
and efficiently operated water system must be established. The design cri-
teria selected for the FOWM system evaluation conform with generally recog-
nized criteria for large community water systems in the United States. The 
standards selected for the FOWM system are based on criteria established by 
the Virginia State Health Department, criteria established by the Insurance 
Service Office (ISO), and generally accepted rules of thumb. The design 
criteria are summarized in the following paragraphs. 
System pressure 
55. During normal operation, system pressures should range from an 
allowable maximum of 100 psi to an allowable minimum of 40 psi. During emer-
gency situations such as a fire flow, pressures should be maintained above 
20 psi. Pressures much greater than 100 psi have a tendency to waste water 
and could damage existing residential and commercial plumbing systems. A 
pressure of 40 psi allows water to be supplied to the top floor of a four-
story building. The 20-psi minimum has been set by the Virginia State Health 
Department and ensures adequate pressure for fighting fires. 
Velocity and head loss 
56. Using generally accepted rules of thumb, the maximum permissible 
velocity in mains with pipe diameter greater than or equal to 12 in. was set 
at 10 ft/sec. Velocities greater than this value may cause transient pressure 
problems or line scouring if they act over long periods of time. The maximum 
desirable head loss was set at 5 ft/1,000 ft of main. 
Evaluation 
57. In order to evaluate the performance of the existing FOWM system, 
the network was analyzed using the computer model for four different loading 
conditions. The four loading conditions were: 
a. Average daily demand. 
b. Maximum daily demand. 
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c. Peak hourly demand. 
d. Fire demand. 
58 . Historical records for the Arlington County system indicate that 
the maximum daily demand is about 1.4 times the average daily day demand. Fur-
thermore, the records indicate that the peak hourly demand is 1.8 times the 
maximum daily demand or 2.5 times the average daily demand. For the purpose 
of this study, the same factors were used for the FOWM system. 
59. Fire demands were placed at the Pentagon, National Airport, and 
Fort Myer. All fire demands were superimposed on a maximum daily demand pat-
tern. Using the 1980 Fire Suppression Rating Schedule (ISO 1980), the fire 
demand for the Pentagon and National Airport was placed at 7,500 gpm. The 
fire demand at Fort Myer was set at 2,400 gpm. Fire service for the Navy 
Annex is provided by Arlington County, thus a fire demand was not placed at 
the Navy Annex. 
Average daily demands 
60. For average daily demand loadings, the existing FOWM system per-
forms well. Average system pressures, excluding those at the higher eleva-
tions by the Navy Annex and Henderson Hall, are about 85 psi. Pressures range 
from about 100 psi in the 30-in. main near Roosevelt Island to 64 psi near the 
entrance to the Navy Annex . Pressures at the Navy Annex and Henderson Hall 
are approximately 35 psi, which appears adequate for the booster pump at 
Henderson Hall and the hydropneumatic tank in the basement of the Navy Annex. 
Based on the results of the model, the hydraulic gradient for all lines is 
below 5 ft/1,000 ft. Pipe velocities range from 0.2 to 2.8 fps. 
Maximum daily demands 
61. The ex.isting FOWM system also performs adequately under maximum day 
loading conditions. System pressures range from 97 to 61 psi with an average 
system-wide pressure of 82 psi. Pressures at the Navy Annex and Henderson 
Hall average about 30 psi. Although a bit higher than for average daily 
demand loadings, the line losses for the maximum day loading are still below 
the design standard (5 ft/1,000 ft) with the exception of an 8-in . pipe at the 
Navy Annex. The hydraulic gradient in this line is just over 8 ft/1,000 ft. 
Pipe velocities in the system range from 0.2 to 3.9 fps. 
Peak hourly demands 
62. Performance of the existing FOWM system under peak hourly demands 
is also adequate. System pressures average just over 70 psi with a range of 
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89 to 48 psi. Pressures at the suction side of the pressure control devices 
at the Navy Annex and Henderson Hall vary from 15 to 7 psi. During peak 
hourly demands, it is possible these low pressures may interfere with the nor-
mal operation of the booster pump and hydropneumatic tank at the Navy Annex 
and Henderson Hall. In several lines the head loss ratio exceeds 
5 ft/1,000 ft; however, pipe velocities remain below the established criteria. 
Fire demands 
63. The existing FOWM system is capable of handling a fire demand of 
7,500 gpm at the Pentagon during maximum daily demands. Under such a loading, 
the system pressures range from 89 to 43 psi. At the Navy Annex and Henderson 
Hall, the pressures dropped to 12 psi under these conditions. This may inter-
fere with proper operation of the pressure control devices. For this loading 
the head loss ratios were generally below the design limit. The one exception 
was the 24-in. main on the west side of the Pentagon in the immediate vicinity 
of the fire demand. Head losses along this section of pipe were on the order 
of 16.5 ft/1,000 ft and velocities approached 6 fps. Elsewhere, velocities 
ranged from 0.2 to 4 fps. The fire flow available to the Pentagon at 20 psi 
during maximum daily demands is 14,000 gpm. 
64. Although the existing system can handle a fire at the Pentagon, the 
system cannot provide adequate pressures for a fire demand of 7,500 gpm at 
National Airport. System pressures are adequate through most of the network; 
however, they are unacceptable (less than 20 psi) east of 1-95. The decrease 
in pressure is due to the high head losses in the single 16-in. main serving 
the airport. Because of the high demand at National Airport, several lines 
around the Pentagon also experience high head losses since they provide the 
primary path of flow to the airport. (Note: All analysis for the existing 
system were made with the assumption that the 16-in. loop around the Pentagon 
was broken as is currently the case.) The fire flow available to National 
Airport through the existing system during maximum daily demands is 3,500 gpm. 
This does not meet the ~SO .f~re flow requirements for a facility of this size . 
65. The existing system is capable of supplying Fort Myer with adequate 
flows during a fire within the compound. This is based on the assumption that 
the Fort Myer booster pump station is withdrawing water at a rate of 
2,400 gpm, which is the rated capacity of the pump. With a fire demand at 
Fort Myer during maximum daily demands, the average FOWM system pressure is 
74 psi and falls no lower than 58 psi. Pressures at the Navy Annex and 
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Henderson Hall are about 27 psi but appear to be adequate for the booster pump 
and hydropneumatic tank. 
Pipe Outage Analysis 
66. In order to assess the reliability of the existing system, the 
sys tem was evaluated for 10 different pipe outage scenarios. Each scenario is 
identified in Table 7 and Figure 12. Each pipe outage scenario was evaluated 
for the loading conditions listed below: 
a. Average daily demand. 
b. Maximum daily demand. 
c. Peak hourly demand. 
d. Fire demands. 
Table 7 
Pipe Outage Scenarios 
30-in. main under Key Bridge 
16-in. main under Key Bridge 
30-in. main along Jefferson Davis Hwy. between Marshall Dr. and Memorial Dr. 
30-in. main along Jefferson Davis Hwy. between Memorial Dr. and the Pentagon 
16-in. main along Eisenhower Dr. between Marshall Dr. and Memorial Dr. 
16-in. main along Eisenhower Dr. between Memorial Dr. and McMillan Dr. 
12-in. main at Columbia Pike from the A.N.C Service building to southwest 
corner of the Pentagon south parking lot 
18-in. main along the western boundary of the Pentagon south parking lot 
24-in. main just west of l-95 from the southwest corner of the Pentagon 
parking lot to Fern St. and Army-Navy Dr. 
16-in. main along 15th St. between Eads St. and Washington National Airport 
36 
, 
' 
. . 
TO D .C. FIRST H luH: 
, . 
603 
. 
. . 
.. 
.. • 0 : 
OALI:CARLIA WATER PLANT 
•• 0 • 
.. 
. . 
' 
-lllliiiiii(-~ -!!!!!~ 
I 
' I 
' 
625 )I 
:c: 
;-;:: 
Gl& • 617 6 19 6 12 623 629 
. . 
. . 
ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY 627 631 
I 
FORT MYER 
NAVY ANNE.X 
635), ~3 (tsJJ 
HlNOERSON 
HALL 
• 
.. 
. . 
• 
• 
. . 
•• :. • .. • ".•,: I . • 
• • 0 • • •• • • • • . . .... . 4 •• • • ••• • 
WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT"···· 
. . . .. . . . ·:· 
6!> I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
63& 
·' ' 
·: . 642 . 6!>0 . :. 648 ·:. 
ti38 
LEGEND 
--PIPE OUTAGE 
Figure 12 . Location of pipe outage scenarios 
• 
(1) Fire demand at the Pentagon. 
(2) Fire demand at Washington National Airport. 
(3) Fire demand at Fort Myer. 
For each of the pipe outage scenarios evaluated, all interconnections with 
Arlington County were assumed to be closed. This allows only the FOWM system 
to be analyzed with no external support from other distribution systems. 
Pressure index 
67. When analyzing a water distribution system for different pipe out-
age conditions, it is desirable to rank the scenarios to determine the most 
severe conditions. In order to rank the scenarios, some type of severity 
index is needed. The severity index used in this study is a pressure index 
based on pressure differences and is defined as follows: 
where 
N 
L: (Pi - p . ) mJ.n 
PI - pressure index 
i=l PI -
N - total number of nodes 
P. -pressure at junction node i 
~ 
P . - minimum allowable pressure 
mJ.n 
N 
(1) 
68. The advantage of using a severity index, such as the one above, is 
that it enables identification of those key mains which, when placed out of 
service, will adversely affect the performance of the FOWM system. The 
greater the value of the pressure index, the less impact a particular pipe 
outage has on the overall performance of the system. Consequently, one may 
tell at a glance which pipe outages result in an undesirable condition. 
69. All 40 nodes within the FOWM system were included in the computa-
tion of the pressure index except for four nodes at the Navy Annex and Hender-
son Hall. Nodes at the Navy Annex and Henderson Hall were omitted because 
they are at much higher elevations than the remainder of the system and have 
pressure control devices to boost pressures to acceptable levels. Including 
these nodes in computation of the pressure indices would have skewed the 
results. 
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70. In addition to the pressure index, the number of nodes which fail 
to meet the minimum allowable pressure are determined. All the nodes in FOWM, 
including those at the Navy Annex and Henderson Hall, are included in this 
analysis. 
71. For all scenarios except those involving fire demands, the minimum 
allowable pressure was set at 40 psi. For fire demand scenarios, the minimum 
allowable pressure was set at 20 psi. The pressure indices for each pipe out-
age under each loading condition for the existing system and the number of 
nodes which fail to meet minimum allowable pressure requirements are shown in 
Table 8. 
Average daily loading 
72. During average daily demands, the FOWM system performs adequately 
for all of the 10 pipe outage scenarios. Average system pressures do fluctu-
ate a little depending upon the particular line placed out of service; how-
ever, for all cases the pressure was maintained above 40 psi minimum 
throughout most of the system. The lowest pressures are associated with the 
case where the 30-in. supply line is taken out of service. For this scenario, 
the lowest pressure, excluding those at the Navy Annex and Henderson Hall, was 
50 psi. Pressure at the Navy Annex and Henderson Hall was 20 psi. 
Maximum daily loading 
73. For the most part, the FOWM system can also maintain adequate sys-
tem pressures for all 10 pipe outages during maximum daily demands. The 
largest pressure drop occurs when the 30-in. supply line is removed from ser-
vice. Even though adequate pressure is maintained throughout most of the FOWM 
system, up to 10 nodes fail to meet minimum pressure requirements when this 
vital link is placed out of service. When the 30-in. main is taken out of 
service, flow is rerouted through smaller lines thus resulting in higher head 
losses. 
Peak hourly loading 
74. Under peak hour loading conditions, average system pressures drop 
significantly if any segment of the 30-in. main is taken out of service. 
Pressures fall so low, in fact, that it is unlikely that demands in the FOWM 
system could be fully met even with the 16-in. river crossing in operation. 
This is due to the large head losses which occur in the 16-in. line. If the 
30-in. line is in service, the FOWM can sustain the remaining set of pipe 
outages. 
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Table 8 
Pressure Indices for Existing System* 
ADD MDD PHD Fl F2 F3 
Pipe Outage PI FN PI FN PI FN PI FN PI FN PI 
30 in. Key Bridge 30.10 4 14.43 6 - 51.47 38 -181.09 39 -210.21 39 6 .14 
16 in. Key Bridge 44.62 4 41.51 4 28.95 4 45.11 12 15.22 12 61.22 
30 in. Davis Hwy. Ill 35.58 4 24.66 4 -21.09 30 -165.33 32 -190. 39 32 53.01 
30 in. Davis Hwy. 112 31.57 4 17.19 10 -4 3 . 28 29 - 273 . 04 31 - 295.59 31 48.30 
16 in. Eisenhower Dr. Ill 44.33 4 40.98 4 27.37 5 44.56 4 10.55 12 62.25 
16 in. Eisenhower Dr. 112 44.21 4 40.76 4 26.71 6 44.05 4 8.96 14 62.09 
12 in. Navy Annex 44.89 4 42.03 4 30.48 4 48 .34 0 17.17 8 62.60 
18 in. Pentagon 43.12 4 38 .71 4 20 .64 13 50.85 0 -126.13 21 60.42 
24 in. Airport -++ 13 -++ 13 -++ 13 -++ 12 -++ 9 
16 in. Airport ++ 11 -++ 11 ++ 11 ++ 10 ++ 7 ++ 
No pipe outages 44.88 4 42.02 4 30 .48 4 48.94 3 19.17 12 63.12 
* ADD = average daily demands, MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD - peak hourly demands, F1 - Pentagon fire 
demand. 
F2 = National Airport fire demand. 
F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, PI = pressure index; and FN - failed nodes. 
++ = indicates National Airport is without water. 
FN 
14 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9 
7 
0 
Fire demands 
75 . The existing system was also analyzed for various main outages with 
fire demands of 7,500 gpm placed at the Pentagon and National Airport and 
2,400 gpm at Fort Myer. Generally, the system can handle all fire demands if 
the 30-in. line remains in service. If any segment of the 30-in. main is 
taken out of service, then only the fire demand at Fort Myer can be satisfied. 
Furthermore, if the 18-in. main by the Pentagon is placed out of service, fire 
demands at National Airport cannot be met. (Note : Fort Myer, unlike the 
remainder of the FOWM system, has a storage facility at the military complex 
to augment supply.) 
Summary 
76. In general, with no pipe outages the existing FOWM system is ade-
quate for most loading conditions. With the exception of a fire demand at 
Washington National Airport, pressures within most of the FOWM system are 
sufficient to allow for the proper delivery of water. The fire flow capacity 
of the 24- and 16-in. airport feed is 3,500 gpm during maximum daily demands. 
As a result, the ISO requirement of 7,500 gpm cannot be met. Also, during 
periods of high demand, pressures at the Navy Annex and Henderson Hall drop to 
levels which may affect proper operat ion of the pressure control devices at 
these locations. The performance of the existing FOWM system deteriorates 
dramatically when certain key mains fail or are taken out of service . These 
problem areas are itemized in the following paragraphs. 
77. The existing FOWM system is served entirely from the 30- and 16-in. 
mains suspended beneath Key Bridge. This is the only independent source of 
supply for the system. If this link were to fail, demands in the existing 
FOWM system could not be met. In order for demands to be satisfied under this 
• 
condition, an alternate means of supply, such as opening interconnections with 
the Arlington County system, must be found . 
78. The existing FOWM system is almost entirely dependent upon the 
30-in. main which extends from Key Bridge to the north face of the Pentagon. 
If any segment of this vital link were to be taken out of service, system 
pressures would be adversely affected. Moreover, if this pipe were taken out 
of ser vice during periods of high demands, line losses in the paralleling 
16-in. main would be so great that pressures and flows in the FOWM system 
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would be significantly reduced to the point where it is unlikely that system 
demands could be fully met. 
79. Another area of major concern is the main which extends from the 
southwest corner of the Pentagon to Washington National Airport. This link is 
made up of a 16-in. line and a 24-in. line connected in series. This single 
main is the only source of water for National Airport. If this line were to 
fail, National Airport would be without water unless an interconnection with 
Arlington were opened. With this line in service and during periods of high 
flow to National Airport, excessive head loss in the 16-in. segment of this 
line produces pressures below the minimum acceptable level. 
80. A third area of concern is the 10-in. line which feeds the Navy 
Annex and Henderson Hall. If this line were placed out of service, these 
facilities would be without water. Furthermore, the proper operation of both 
the booster pump at Henderson Hall and the hydropneumatic tank at the Navy 
Annex may be affected when the 16-in. main along Eisenhower Drive is disabled. 
This is especially true during periods of high demand regardless of which 
mains are out of service. 
81. For those cases where installations would be without water during a 
pipe outage, it is apparent that with the existing system an interconnection 
must be opened between the outage and demand. In some cases existing system 
interconnections are available with the Arlington County system. However, it 
is possible that the operation of a particular interconnection could have a 
detrimental effect on the Arlington system. This possibility is investigated 
in the following parts. 
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PART V: SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS 
Identification of Supply Alternatives 
82. As demonstrated in the previous part, the existing system is highly 
vulnerable to the loss of the supply lines suspended from Key Bridge and the 
30-in. transmission main between Key Bridge and the Pentagon. National Air-
port is dependent upon a single line composed of a 24-in. main and a 16-in. 
main in series extending from the Pentagon to the airport. Both Henderson 
Hall and the Navy Annex are dependent upon a single 10-in. line along Columbia 
Pike. In order to increase the overall reliability of the FOWM system, sev-
eral possible alternatives were investigated. The primary purpose of these 
alternatives is to provide an alternate source of supply t o the FOWM sys tem in 
the event of a failure of either the 30-in. transmission main or the entire 
Key Bridge river ·crossing. Other alternatives help to increase the amount of 
flow to a particular area or reduce the amount of head loss within the system. 
The various alternatives were grouped into five basic categories: 
a. Use of existing interconnections. 
b. Development of new interconnections. 
c. Construction of additional river crossings . 
d. Construction of new storage facilities. 
e. Construction of additional pipelines. 
Existing Interconnections 
83. Seven existing interconnections between the FOWM and Arlington 
County sys tems are available for use during emergencies, such as a main out-
age. The performance of each existing emergency interconnection was evaluated 
as part of the FOWM reliability study. Five of the interconnections join the 
FOWM system with the Third Gravity pressure zone of Arlington County. The 
remaining two interconnections join the FOWM network with the First Gravity 
and Second Gravity pressure zones of the Arlington County system . The inter-
connection between First Gravity and FOWM includes a PRV . The locations of 
the existing interconnections are shown in Figure 13, and each interconnection 
is described below. 
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Figure 13. Location of existing interconnections 
15th and Eads interconnection 
84. The 15th and Eads interconnection is located at the intersection of 
15th and Eads Streets in Crystal City and provides a connection between FOWM 
and the Arlington County Third Gravity pressure zone. This interconnection is 
perhaps the most important of the seven existing connections. The intercon-
nection links a 24-in. main from the FOWM system with a 12-in. main from the 
Arlington County system. A flowmeter in the connection measures the amount of 
flow between the two systems. A detail of the interconnection is shown in 
Figure 14. 
Fern Street interconnection 
85. Another interconnection is located at the intersection of Fern 
Street and Army-Navy Drive. This interconnection provides a link between a 
24-in. main in the FOWM system with a 12-in. main in the Arlington County 
Third Gravity system. A detail of this interconnection is provided in Fig-
ure 15. 
Crystal City interconnections 
86. Two additional interconnections which link FOWM and Arlington 
County Third Gravity pressure zone are located in Crystal City near National 
Airport. The first is located just east of the Jefferson Davis Highway on 
15th Street. This interconnection joins the 16-in. main t o National Airpor t 
with a 12-in. main from the Arlington County system. 
87. The second Crystal City interconnection is closer to the airport. 
This interconnection is located at the intersection of 20th and Ball Streets 
and links the 16-in. FOWM airport feed with an additional 12-in. main from 
Arlington County . Details of these interconnections are shown in Figures 16 
and 17. 
Heating Plant interconnection 
88. Another interconnection between FOWM and Arlington County Third 
Gravity is located near the Pentagon heating plant just east of the I-95 
north-bound lane. This interconnection joins a 6-in. FOWM main with an 8-in. 
Arlington main. A detail of this interconnection is shown in Figure 18. 
Navy Annex interconnection 
89. An interconnection at the Navy Annex provides a link between the 
Second Gravity pressure zone of the Arlington system and the FOWM system. 
This interconnection is located within the Navy Annex compound at Columbia and 
Oak Streets . Normal water demands for the Navy Annex are supplied from the 
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FOWM system while fire hydrants are tied to the Second Gravity pressure zone. 
The Navy Annex interconnection links an 8-in. pipe from FOWM with a 12-in. 
pipe f rom Arlington County. Details of this interconnection are shown in Fig-
ure 19. 
Fort Myer interconnection 
90. This interconnection is located near the intersection of Arling ton 
and Washington Blvds ., just south of Fort Myer. The interconnection ser ves 
Fort Myer during emergencies and is supplied from the First Gravity pressure 
zone of the Arlington County system. The interconnection consists of a 10-in. 
line from FOWM and a 16-in. line from Arlington. A PRV is located in the 
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10-in. line; however, the setting of the PRV is unknown. A detail of this 
interconnection is shown in Figure 20. 
New Interconnections 
91. The reliability of the FOWM system may be increased by constructing 
additional interconnections between FOWM and the Arlington County network. 
The additional interconnections would be used to supply water to areas within 
the FOWM system which would be without water if certain critical links (Key 
Bridge river crossing, 30-in. transmission main, airport feed) were placed out 
of service. For this study, three additional interconnections were consid-
ered, two between Rosslyn and FOWM and one at National Airport. 
Rosslyn interconnections 
92. An interconnection between FOWM and the Arlington County Rosslyn 
pressure zone would improve reliability in the northwest corner of the FOWM 
system . A connection in this area would provide a feed to supply the FOWM 
system in the event of failure of the Key Bridge crossing. 
93. Two interconnections between the FOWM system and Rosslyn pressure 
zone are proposed to improve reliability. The first interconnection consists 
of approximately 2,000 ft of 16-in. water main. The line would extend from 
the FOWM 30-in. meter vault underneath Key Bridge to the end of an existing 
16-in . line in Rosslyn's Key Blvd. at Fort Myer Drive. Figure 21 details this 
connection . 
94. The second interconnection between FOWM and the Rosslyn pressure 
zone involves 1,500 ft of 12-in. pipe. This line would run from the end of 
the 16-in. FOWM main a t the entrance of Fort Myer to the end of an existing 
12-in. main at 12th Street and North Nash Street. Figure 22 shows this con-
nection. Because the Rosslyn pressure zone operates at a higher hydraulic 
grade than the FOWM system (approximately 320ft), PRV's set at 250ft must be 
installed in each of the proposed lines. 
National Airport interconnection 
95. Another proposed interconnection is between National Airport and 
the Arlington County Gravity Three pressure zone. An 8-in. line linking the 
airport with Gravity Three at the south end of the airport was severely 
damaged and taken out of service several years ago. The proposed connection 
would replace this line to provide additional reliability for National 
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Airport. This line would also increase the fire flow capacity to the airport. 
The interconnection would consist of 1,950 ft of 12-in. line with a check 
valve and meter east of the connection with Arlington County. A tie-in with 
the FOWM system would be located adjacent to the southwest terminal, and con-
nection with Arlington County would occur in a 12-in. county line near the 
intersection of Davis Hwy. and the airport access road. Details are provided 
in Figure 23. Depending upon the condition of the existing 8- in. line, it is 
possible to make this interconnection by replacing that segment of damaged 
line. This interconnection, if constructed, should remain open at all times. 
New River Crossings 
96. Presently the FO\~ system is served from DC First High via a 30-in. 
transmission main and a 16-in. transmission main suspended beneath Key Bridge. 
If the existing bridge crossing were to be placed out of service, the existing 
FOWM system would be without water. Emergency interconnections with Arlington 
County would have to be opened to obtain water. A new river crossing would 
provide additional reliability against this scenario without relying on an 
external source of supply. Four variations of this alternative are proposed. 
These include: 
a. Roosevelt Bridge river crossing. 
b. 14th Street Bridge river crossing from DC First High. 
c. 14th Street Bridge river crossing with booster pump from DC Low 
service. 
d . Roosevelt Island subaqueous river crossing. 
97. The Roosevelt and 14th Street bridges were selected for considera-
tion as they would provide completely new crossing sites to replace the Key 
Bridge crossing if it were taken out of service. These bridges are structur-
ally suitable for water lines suspended from beneath the bridge decks. Memo-
rial Bridge is not suitable for this type of crossing. Details of each bridge 
crossing as well as the subaqueous crossing are given in the following 
sections. 
Roosevelt Bridge crossing 
98. The Roosevelt Bridge crossing involves a 30-in. line from Foxhall 
tank east along MacArthur Blvd. and Canal Road to Key Bridge. At this point 
the line turns southeast and parallel to the Potomac River up to Roosevelt 
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Bridge. This line would be approximately 14,150 ft long. The new line origi-
nates at Foxhall tank so that the hydraulics of the FOWM system will continue 
to be controlled by the Dalecarlia Pump Station. The 30-in. line would be 
suspended beneath Roosevelt Bridge across the Potomac River and through the 
George Washington Parkway and US Highway 66 interchange for an additional 
4,000 ft until it intersects the FOWM 30-in. main at the junction of Davis 
Hwy. and Marshall Drive. Details of this project are shown in Figure 24. 
14th Street Bridge crossing 
99. The 14th Street Bridge crossing is very similar to the Roosevelt 
Bridge crossing in that it follows the same path from Foxhall tank to 
Roosevelt Bridge. At Roosevelt Bridge it continues to parallel the Potomac 
River up to 14th Street Bridge. Like the previous alternative, this line is 
also a 30-in. pipe with a total length of 21,700 ft from the tank to the 
bridge. An additional 30-in. line 2,500 ft long would be suspended beneath 
14th Street Bridge to make up the actual river crossing. The 30-in. main 
would parallel the railroad tracks by National Airport for an additional 
5,200 ft to a point east of Davis Hwy. where it would tie-in with the existing 
16-in. airport feed. Figure 25 provides details of this crossing. 
Booster pump off Low service 
100. A variation of the 14th Street Bridge crossing would be to supply 
FOWM from the DC Low service pressure zone via a booster pump. Under this 
alternative, a booster pump station would be placed at 12th Street and Maine 
Avenue in DC. Water would be supplied from DC Low service to the booster pump 
through a 20-in. transmission main at 12th and Maine. On the discharge end of 
the pump, 11,270 ft of 30-in. line would run from 12th and Maine across 14th 
Street Bridge and would follow the same path as described for the previous 
14th Street Bridge crossing. Although any one of a number of pumps could be 
used for this alternative, a 150-hp pump with the characteristics shown in 
Figure 26 was used for purposes of this analysis. This pump was used because 
it provides heads in the range of the operating grades at flows approaching 
peak hourly demand. Figure 27 shows the detail of this alternative. 
Subaqueous river crossing 
101. The initial route of the subaqueous crossing is the same as the 
Roosevelt and 14th Street Bridge crossings. This line would extend from Fox-
hall tank east along MacArthur Blvd. and Canal Road, a distance of about 
1.5 miles, to Key Bridge. At this point the pipe will parallel the Potomac 
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River and the B&O Railroad tracks up to a point south of Wisconsin Avenue. 
The total length of this 30-in. line is approximately 9,700 ft. A 30-in. sub-
merged river crossing would extend from the bank of the Potomac River at Wis-
consin Blvd. south to Theodore Roosevelt Island. A normal trench installation 
may be used to take the line through the island to Little River where another 
submerged crossing would complete the crossing. At this point the line would 
tie into the existing 30-in. steel main along George Washington Parkway. The 
total length of river crossing is 2,600 ft. The entire submerged river cross-
ing alternative is shown in Figure 28. 
New Storage Facilities 
102. Storage for the FOWM system is provided by Foxhall tank located in 
the Dalecarlia First High pressure zone. This reservoir is across the river 
from the FOWM system. Consequently, there is no storage facility in the FOWM 
system. Construction of a storage tank on Federal property on the Virginia 
side of the Potomac River would increase reliability of the FOWM system. 
103. The top elevation of the tank should be 250 ft with a bottom ele-
vation of 225 ft. This will allow for adequate system-wide pressures. The 
most sensible location for the tank is the Navy Annex as the average elevation 
in this area is 150 ft. Locating the tank in a topographically high area 
reduces the height of the tank and thus the cost of the structure. 
104. Tank diameter is a function of tank capacity which in turn depends 
upon the purpose of the storage facility. If the objective of storage is to 
help provide pressure and flow during periods of high demand, such as peak 
hourly loading, then a tank with a capacity in the low 100,000-gal range may 
be used. However, if the primary purpose of the tank is to provide flow 
during major fires, then a tank with much greater capacity should be used. 
Table 9 shows tank capacity required for various fire durations based on a 
fire demand of 7,500 gpm and a tank with top and bottom elevations of 250 and 
225 ft, respectively. 
105. For purposes of analysis, a diameter of 110 ft was used for the 
Navy Annex tank. This corresponds to a capacity of just under 1,800,000 gal. 
This will allow the ISO requirement of a 7,500-gpm fire demand for a duration 
of 4 hr to be met by this tank (ISO 1980). 
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Table 9 
Tank Capacity Evaluation* 
Tank Tank Fire Demand 
Diameter, ft Capacity, MG Duration, hr 
10 0.01 0.03 
20 0.06 0.13 
30 0.13 0.29 
40 0.24 0.52 
so 0.37 0.82 
60 0.53 1.17 
70 0.72 1.60 
80 0 .94 2.09 
90 1.19 2.64 
100 1.47 3.26 
110 1.78 3.95 
120 2.11 4.70 
* 
Top height - 250 ft, bottom width= 225f t, fire demand- 7,500 gpm. 
106. The tank would be placed on the east side of the Navy Annex com-
pound. Approximately 1,500 ft of 16-in. pipe would connect the tank with the 
existing FOWM system at a point just west of the A.N.C. service building. 
Complete details of this proposal are shown in Figure 29. 
New Pipeline Construction 
107. Reliability of the FOWM system may also be improved by adding new 
lines in certain areas within the FOWM system. Not only is reliability 
increased, but adding new lines also has the net effect of improving overall 
system performance. Reliability is increased by introducing system redundancy 
and by creating loops when adding a new line. Performance is improved by 
reduction of head loss. For the purpose of this study, four new main con-
struction projects were considered. Each project is summarized in the follow-
ing sections . 
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Figure 29. Detail of proposed new tank at Navy Annex 
Paralleling 30-in. main 
108. Because the FOWM system is very dependent upon the existing 30-in. 
steel main extending f rom the Maryland side of the Potomac River t o the Penta-
gon, reliability may be improved by constructing new lines paral~el to the 
30-in. line. The total length of this line is a little over 13,500 ft, and it 
is paralleled along its entire length by an existing 16-in main. These lines 
follow generally the same path from the north side of Key Bridge to the inter-
section of Jefferson Davis Hwy. and Marshall Drive. At this point the lines 
diverge from one another with the 30-in. line running along George Washington 
66 
Pa~kway and the 16-in. main running along Eisenhower Drive. 
109. Presently there is a connection between the existing 30- and 
16-in. supply lines in the vicinity of the Roosevelt Bridge interchange. If 
the 30-in. line fails anywhere between the DC side of Key Bridge and this con-
nection (approximately 7,000 ft of pipe), all FOWM supply would have to be 
routed through the parallel 16-in. main. A substantial amount of flow would 
induce significant head losses in this line. Installing new connections at 
various locations between the existing lines would improve reliability and 
reduce losses. 
110. To further improve reliability, new lines could be installed adja-
cent to the existing 30-in. steel main from the intersection of Davis Hwy. and 
Marshall Drive to the end of the existing line at the north face of the Penta-
gon. This construction would involve 6,000 ft of 16-in. water line. Connec-
tions between the proposed and existing lines are placed approximately every 
1,500 ft. Complete details are shown in Figure 30. 
New airport feed 
111. Constructing a new line from the Pentagon to Washington National 
Airport will also improve FOWM system reliability by creating another feed to 
the airport. This plan calls for installing approximately 4,700 ft of 24-in. 
pipe from a point near the eastern corner of the Pentagon southward parallel 
to Davis Hwy. to a point east of Davis Hwy. on 15th Street. Figure 31 pro-
vides the details for this line. This alternative reduces airport dependency 
on the single existing airport feed. 
Closing Pentagon loop 
112. Presently the loop consisting of the 24- and 16-in. pipe around 
the Pentagon is not connected. A 1,120-ft segment of 16-in. line on the 
eastern corner of the Pentagon is out of service and prevents the loop from 
being closed. Figure 32 shows the location of this line. There i s no way of 
serving the heating plant if any portion of the 16-in. line on the southeast 
and southwest face of the Pentagon were to fail unless the heating plant 
interconnection were opened. Repairing· or replacing the line currently out of 
service would allow for this contingency without opening the interconnec tion. 
Furthermore, this alternative would provide better fire flow to the Pentagon. 
New Pentagon loop 
113. There is a possibility that offi ce space expansion at the Pentagon 
will increase floor space and presumably work force about 30 percent. 
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Figure 32 . Detail of proposed closing of Pentagon loop 
Preliminary indications are that the construction site will be located at a 
parking lot adjacent to the southwest building face. If construction does 
proceed, then it would be desirable to place a line on the eastern side of 
this parcel as shown in Figure 33. This pipe would be approximately 550 ft 
long with a diameter of 12 in. It would extend from the existing 16-in. main 
at the south corner of the Pentagon to the existing 24-in. line at the south-
east corner of the potential construction site. This line would not only 
create another loop, thereby increasing reliability, but could also serve as a 
source of supply for future buildings. 
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PART VI: STEADY-STATE ASSESSMENT OF SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS 
Breakdown of Alternatives 
114. In the previous section , several alternatives designed to increase 
FOWM system reliability were identified. These alternatives included: 
a. 
b. 
-
c. 
d. 
e. 
Use of existing interconnections. 
Development of new interconnections. 
Construction of additional river crossings. 
Construction of new storage facilities. 
Construction of additional pipelines. 
The first four alternatives can be thought of as supply alternatives since 
their primary purpose is to provide an alternate source of water to the FOWM 
system in the event of a supply disruption or major demand. The alternative 
involving construction of additional pipelines can be regarded as a main-
strengthening alternative since construction of new pipes within the existing 
FOWM system creates additional loops to help offset the decreased hydraulic 
performance associated with key pipe outages. An alternative involving both a 
supply alternative and main-strengthening alternative can be regarded as a 
combined alternative. 
Steady-State Evaluation of Supply Alternatives 
115. In order to assess the impact of each supply alternative on the 
overall system reliability, each alternative was evaluated for the same 
10 pipe outages used in evaluating the existing system. Furthermore, addi-
tional pipe outages which could affect the performance of the alternatives 
were included to determine the degree of dependency of an alternative upon a 
neighboring system. For example, analyses were made with pipe outages of 
critical mains in Arlington County for the interconnection alternatives to 
determine how dependent the interconnections are upon the Arlington County 
system. Finally, failure of the Key Bridge river crossing was simulated to 
determine the ability of an alternative to independently supply the FOWM 
system. The additional pipe outage scenerios include: 
a. Failure of the Key Bridge river crossing. 
b. Failure of the 36-in. Arlington County feed from Dalecarlia. 
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c. 
d. 
e. 
f . 
..... 
Failure of the 24-in. Arlington County feed from Dalecarlia. 
Failure of the PRV at Army-Navy Drive and South Joyce Street. 
Failure of the PRV at South 16th Street and Lynn Street. 
Failure of the Arlington County Third Gravity storage tank. 
Existing interconnections 
116. 15th and Eads interconnection. The FOWM system can be supplied 
f rom the Arlington County system through the 15th and Eads interconnection for 
most pipe outages. However, with the Key Bridge river crossing out of service 
during periods of high demand, this alternative fails to meet established 
pressure criteria. Furthermore, in order for the 15th and Eads interconnec-
tion to satisfy all FOWM demands with the Key Bridge river crossing out of 
s ervice, the 24-in. main between the Pentagon and National Airport must be 
open at all times regardless of loading condition. 
117. Fern Street interconnection. The FOWM system may also be supplied 
by the Fern Street interconnection. This interconnection operates much the 
same as the 15th and Eads interconnection. Like the 15th and Eads intercon-
nection, this interconnection can supply FOWM for most pipe outages with the 
exception of a loss of the river crossing during a period of peak demand or a 
major fire demand. Moreover, with the river crossing out of service, the 
24-in. airport feed must remain operational at all times in order for any FOWM 
system demands to be met by this alternative. 
118. Crystal City interconnections. Both of the Crystal City intercon-
nections, operating independently of one another, provide an impact similar to 
the two previous interconnections. Both interconnections can supply the FOWM 
system for all scenarios except during peak hourly demand or a major fire 
demand (for the case where the Key Bridge river crossing is out of service). 
If the 24-in. line or the 16-in. line between the Pentagon and National Air-
port were to fail with the Key Bridge river crossing out of service, neither 
of the Crystal City interconnections could supply demands at the Pentgaon, 
Navy Annex, Fort Myer, etc. 
119. Heating plant interconnection. The interconnection at the Penta-
gon heating plant can, by itself, provide adequate flows to the FOWM system 
during average daily and maximum daily loading conditions for most of the pipe 
outage scenarios. In the event the river crossing is eliminated, system pres-
sures drop well below acceptable levels. If the 30- in. main of the Key Bridge 
river crossing is removed, the interconnection is still unable to provide 
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adequate pressures during peak hourly demands and fire demands even with the 
16-in. line in service. Furthermore, this interconnection is unable to meet 
airport demands if any portion of the 24- or 16-in. airport feed is out. 
120. Navy Annex interconnection. This interconnection performs much 
the same as the heating plant interconnection. System pressures are ade-
quately maintained during average and maximum daily loading condition for most 
of the pipe outage scenarios. During high demands such as peak hourly loading 
or fire demands, the average system pressure drops below the required minimum 
when any section of the 30-in. line is removed from service. In addition, 
this interconnection cannot supply National Airport in the event either the 
24- or 16-in. airport supply line is closed. 
121. Fort Myer interconnection. The Fort Myer interconnection makes 
use of a PRV to throttle flow into the Fort Myer system. The exact setting of 
this PRV is unknown, and as a result, a detailed hydraulic analysis of this 
interconnection was not possible. 
122. Summary. In stumnary, it appears that the 15th and Eads, Fern 
Street, and Crystal City interconnections can supply the FOWM system during 
all loading conditions if the 30-in. supply main is taken out of service. 
However, if the 16-in. supply line is lost along with the 30-in. line (Key 
Bridge river crossing), the above interconnections can only handle average 
daily and maximum daily demands. System pressures would fall below acceptable 
limits during peak hourly loading, and fire demands at the Pentagon and Wash-
ington National Airport could not be met. Furthermore, with the Key Bridge 
river crossing placed out of service, the 24- and 16-in. line between the 
Pentagon and National Airport must remain in service at all times in order to 
supply demands in the FOWM system. 
123. The Navy Annex and Pentagon heating plant interconnections also 
appear to be able to adequately sustain pressures in the FOWM system during 
periods of average demand. As demands increase, however, the 30-in. main 
becomes increasingly more important. During periods of high demand or fire 
demand, neither the Navy Annex nor Pentagon heating plant interconnection can 
properly supply the FOWM system without the 30-in. main in service. A summary 
of pressure indices for each of the existing interconnections is provided in 
Appendix B. 
124. From this and previous analyses, it is apparent that the most 
critical link in the FOWM system is the 30-in. steel main extending from DC 
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First High to the Pentagon. During an extended outage of this line, operation 
of the 15th and Eads, Fern Street, or Crystal City interconnection is perhaps 
the best short-term remedy. However, if the Key Bridge river crossing (30-
and 16-in. lines) is taken out of service, none of the existing interconnec-
tions could adequately supply the FOWM system for all loading conditions. 
Because of construction difficulty, failure of the Key Bridge river crossing 
would result in a long-term outage during which time it is highly likely that 
peak hourly demands would, at some time, exist. Preliminary analysis has 
indicated that use of multiple interconnections would still result in inade-
quate system performance. Because of its inability to adequately supply the 
FOWM system, the Naval Annex interconnection should be operated only to supply 
the Annex, not the remainder of the FOWM system. Likewise, the Pentagon heat-
ing plant interconnection should be used in the event the heating plant supply 
line fails. 
New interconnections 
125. Rosslyn interconnection. The hydraulic performance of the pro-
posed Rosslyn interconnections, operating simultaneously, were evaluated for 
the same set of pipe outages and loading conditions as the previous alterna-
tives. The primary objective of constructing the Rosslyn interconnections is 
to provide a source of supply in the event of failure of any portion of the 
Key Bridge river crossing. This system interconnection performs adequately 
during average daily and maximum daily loadings with various FOWM and Arling-
ton mains out of service. However, during peak hourly loadings, system pres-
sures cannot be maintained with .any segment of the 30-in. FOWM transmission 
main out of service. This is due to the large head losses induced in the 
Rosslyn pressure zone during periods of high flow. Furthermore, this alterna-
tive is unable to provide a source of supply for National Airport in the event 
of failure of the airport feed (a 24-in. line and a 16-in. line connected in 
series). Unlike Second and Third Gravity, the Rosslyn pressure zone has no 
storage tank to help supply water and pressure during periods of high demand. 
126. The Rosslyn interconnection fails to maintain adequate system 
pressures with fire demands placed at the Pentagon and National Airport during 
an outage of any section of the 30-in. main. This reiterates the importance 
of the existing 30-in. line. Fire demands at Fort Myer can be met with little 
detrimental effect. A summary of the resulting pressure indices for this 
interconnection is shown in Appendix B. 
76 
127. New airport interconnection. The purpose of this interconnection 
is not to supply the entire FOWM system in the event of failure within the 
network; rather it is intended to provide additional reliability for National 
Airport. At present, the airport is supplied by a single line composed of a 
24-in. main and a 16-in. main connected in series. If this line were to fail, 
an existing Arlington County interconnection must be opened to deliver water 
to the airport. If failure occurred between the interconnection and the air-
port, no water could be delivered to the airport. The new airport intercon-
nection, as proposed, would solve this problem. 
New river crossings 
128. Roosevelt Bridge crossing. During average daily and maximum daily 
demands, the Roosevelt Bridge crossing would provide adequate flows and pres-
sures for each of the pipe outage scenarios. Also, under peak hourly loading 
conditions, this line could satisfy FOWM demands with the Key Bridge river 
crossing off line. 
129. However, if the 30-in. FOWM transmission main were to be taken out 
of service anywhere along its length south of the new bridge tie-in during 
peak hour demands or fire loadings at the Pentagon and National Airport, aver-
age system pressures would fall below acceptable limits. Again, this is due 
to large volumes of water flowing through the existing 16-in. FOWM main, caus-
ing excessive head loss. Fire demands at Fort Myer can be met during any pipe 
outage with little adverse effect on the system. 
130. Although this alternative allows FOWM to be supplied from DC First 
High in the event of Key Bridge river crossing failure, National Airport can-
not be supplied if any part of the existing airport feed were closed. If this 
scenario were to occur, a system interconnection in the vicinity of the air-
port must be opened to supply National Airport. 
131. 14th Street Bridge crossing. The 14th Street Bridge crossing pro-
vides adequate system pressures for all pipe outages under each loading condi-
tion with the exception of one case. The case in which the new crossing does 
not provide adequate pressure is for a fire demand at the Pentagon with the 
Key Bridge river crossing out of service. This is due to large line losses in 
the line between the proposed tie-in of this alternative with the FOWM system 
and the Pentagon. 
132. Unlike the Roosevelt Bridge cross ing, demands at National Airport 
can be met under this proposal if the existing airport feed were t o fail 
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between the Pentagon and the tie-in with FOWM. This is possible because of 
the location of the tie-in with the FOWM system. However, without an inter-
connection between Arlington County and National Airport (as described in t he 
previous section), the 14th Street Bridge alternative is unable to supply 
demands at National Airport if a segment of line between the proposed tie-in 
and the airport were to fail. 
133. Booster pump off Low service. The performance of the booster pump 
alternative is very similar to the 14th Street Bridge river crossing from DC 
First High because of the location of the proposed tie-in with FOWM. Adequate 
system pressures can be maintained during all pipe scenarios with the excep-
tion of a fire demand at the Pentagon wit h the Key Bridge river crossing out 
of service. Again, this is due to the large head losses in the 24- and 16-in. 
lines between the proposed connec t ion and the Pentagon. 
134. Similarly, demands at National Airport can be met with this alter-
native if the existing airport feed were to fail between the Pentagon and the 
proposed tie-in with FOWM. However, without an interconnection between 
Arlington County and National Airport, t his alternative is unable to supply 
demands at the airport if a segment of line between the proposed tie-in and 
the airport were to fail . 
135. Subaqueous river crossing. Performance of the subaqueous river 
crossing is very much like that of the Roosevelt Bridge crossing. Average 
system pressure can be adequately maintained during all scenarios except dur-
ing periods of high flow when the existing 30-in. FOWM main is out. Fur ther-
more, demands at National Airport cannot be met with this crossing if any 
portion of the line feeding the airport were to fail. Pressure indices for 
all new river crossing alternatives are summarized in Appendix B. 
New storage facilities 
136. A tank placed at the Navy Annex with a top elevation of 250 ft, a 
bottom elevation of 225 ft, and capacity of 1 , 800,000 gal was evaluated to 
judge its contribution to FOWM reliability and performance. Operation of the 
facility was examined for the same pipe outages as the previous supply alter-
natives. For purposes of analysis, the tank was assumed to be full; however, 
steady-state simulations were made with the tank half-full and empty to eval-
uate the sensitivity of the FOWM system to tank level. 
137. Adequate system pressures may be maintained with the Navy Annex 
storage tank during average daily, maximum daily, and peak hourly demands for 
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all pipe outages. Because of high head loss in existing FOWM lines, the tank 
cannot provide adequate system pressure for instances where the 30-in. FOWM 
main is out of service and fire demands are placed at the Pentagon or National 
Airport. Pressure indices for this alternative are summarized in Appendix B. 
138. With the Key Bridge river crossing out of service, a storage 
facility at the Navy Annex can supply water to the entire FOWM system. How-
ever, this supply is limited and could not meet demands during long-term 
supply outages. This alternative is unable to meet airport demands if a seg-
ment of the existing airport feed were to fail. An interconnection in the 
vicinity of the airport must be opened in this case. 
Summary 
139. Several supply alternatives have been proposed in an effort to 
improve the reliability of the FOWM water distribution system. The primary 
purpose of the supply alternatives is to provide an alternate source of supply 
to FOWM in the event of a supply disruption, such as failure of the Key Bridge 
river crossing, or a major system load, such as a fire at the Pentagon. Each 
of the alternatives is able to supply the FOWM system with varying levels of 
performance. 
140. Of the existing interconnections, the 15th and Eads, Fern Street, 
and Crystal City interconnections can supply the FOWM system during most pipe 
scenarios. The only case where these interconnections fail is when the Key 
Bridge crossing is out of service during periods of high demand. However, 
this assumes that the line between National Airport and the Pentagon is in 
service at all times. If any portion of this line between the Pentagon and 
the interconnection were to fail during a Key Bridge outage, demands at the 
Pentagon, Navy Annex, Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, and Arlington National Ceme-
tery could not be met. 
141. The Navy Annex and Pentagon heating plant connections are unable 
to adequately supply the FOWM system for several pipe scenarios. These inter-
connections are able to provide adequate supply t o the facilitie s in the 
immediate vicinity of the connection (Navy Annex and Henderson Hall, Pentagon 
heating plant ) and as a result should be used t o supply these facilities dur-
ing emergency conditions. 
142. The Rosslyn interconnection is unable to provide adequate pressure 
and flow to the FOWM system during high flow periods if any portion of the 
30-in. FOWM transmission main is out of service. This is due to large head 
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losses in lines located in the Rosslyn pressure zone. The National Airport 
interconnection is able to provide flow at adequate pressure to the airport 
under average daily, maximum daily, and peak hourly demands if the existing 
airport feed were to be closed. However, this alternative cannot, by itself, 
supply the required fire demand of 7,500 gpm to National Airport. 
143. Each of the proposed river crossings is able to adequately supply 
the FOWM system during most pipe outage scenarios. Some of the river crossing 
alternatives perform better than others for certain scenarios. For example, 
neither the Roosevelt Bridge crossing nor the subaqueous crossing is able to 
supply demands at National Airport if a portion of the existing airport feed 
were to fail between the Pentagon and Crystal City. Both the 14th Street 
Bridge crossing and the Booster Pump Off Low Service alternatives, on the 
other hand, are able to supply National Airport during this scenario. Each of 
the river crossing alternatives is able to supply FOWM for an outage of Key 
Bridge assuming all remaining FOWM lines are in service. 
144. The new storage tank at the Navy Annex alternative is similar to 
the Roosevelt Bridge and subaqueous river crossing proposals in that it is 
able to adequately supply FOWM system demands during most pipe outage scenar-
ios. Like these river crossing alternatives, the proposed tank cannot deliver 
adequate pressure and flow for outages of the 30-in. transmission main during 
periods of high demand. Furthermore, this alternative is unable to supply 
enough volume of water to meet ISO fire fighting requirements (7,500 gpm for 
4 hr) with the Key Bridge river crossing out of service. 
Main-Strengthening Alternatives 
145. Analysis of the existing system identified several critical lines 
or pairs of lines which, when placed out of service, would result in unaccept-
able hydraulic performance of the FOWM system. These lines include the 30-
and 16-in. mains suspended beneath Key Bridge (Key Bridge river crossing), the 
30-in. FOWM transmission main from Key Bridge to the Pentagon, the 24-in. main 
between the Pentagon and 15th and Eads Streets, and the 16-in. line between 
15th and Eads Streets and National Airport. The last two lines comprise the 
only feed to National Airport. 
146. Two alternatives were proposed; each was designed to reduce the 
effect of an outage of a critical line. These alternatives included 
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paralleling the 30-in. FOWM transmission main and installing a new airport 
feed. Two additional alternatives involving new pipeline construction were 
also proposed. Closing the Pentagon loop would make the FOWM system more 
hydaulically efficient by reducing head losses in the vicinity of the Pen-
tagon. Constructing a new Pentagon l oop is contingent upon proposed expansion 
of the Pentagon, but would also reduce head losses in this area. Each of the 
main-strengthening alternatives was evaluated for the same pipe outage 
scenarios as the existing system. 
Paralleling the 30-in. 
main and new airport feed 
147 . Paralleling the existing 30-in. FOWM transmission main with a 
16-in. line and installing more interconnections between the existing 30- and 
16-in. mains between Key Bridge and Marshall Drive helps to reduce the effect 
of an outage of the 30-in. line. Adequate system pressures can be maintained 
during most pipe outage scenarios. However, this alternative is unable to 
ensure adequate system-wide pressure during an outage of the 30-in. main under 
Key Bridge during fire demands at the Pengaton or National Airport. During 
these scenarios, high flows in the 16-in. line suspended beneath Key Bridge 
result in excessive head loss such that system pressures fall below minimum 
requirements. Furthermore, this alternative does not help to reduce large 
head losses generated in the existing airport feed during a fire at National 
Airport. Pressure indices for this alternative are shown in Appendix B. 
148. Constructing a new feed to National Airport does not help to off-
set the reduced system performance caused by an outage of the 30-in. FOWM 
transmission main. However, this alternative does improve system reliability 
by creating another feed to National Airport. If any segment of the existing 
airport feed were to be placed out of service, demands at National Airport 
could still be met under this alternative without opening an interconnection 
with Arlington County. Furthermore, the new airport feed and the existing 
airport feed will deliver a fire flow of 7,750 gpm under maximum daily loading 
conditions, which exceeds ISO requirements. Pressure indices for this alter-
native are shown in Appendix B. 
Closing the 16-in. Pentagon loop 
149. Closing that portion of the 16-in. Pentagon loop which is cur-
rently out of service does not appreciably improve system performance over the 
existing FOWM system. System pressures fall well below acceptable limits if 
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any portion of the 30-in. FOWM transmission main is taken out of service. 
Also, demands at National Airport cannot be met under this alternative if a 
segment of the existing airport feed were to fail. Constructing this loop 
does increase reliability, however, by adding system redundancy. Pressure 
indices for this alternative are provided in Appendix B. 
New Pentagon loop 
150. Constructing a new Pentagon loop will not, by itself, reduce the 
effect of an outage of the 30-in. FOWM transmission main. System pressures 
fall below acceptable limits during peak hourly loading or fire demands at the 
Pentagon and National Airport under this alternative when a segment of 30-in. 
line is placed out of service. The only difference between existing system 
performance and performance under this alternative is the reduced effect of an 
outage of the 18-in. line by the Pentagon during a National Airport fire. 
This alternative will also ensure that demands at National Airport are met if 
a section of the 24-in. line along the Pentagon south parking lot were to 
fail. Pressure indices for the New Pentagon Loop alternative are shown in 
Appendix B. 
Summary 
151. None of the proposed main-strengthening alternatives, acting inde-
pendently, will completely offset the reduction in system pressure and flow 
caused by outage of certain key lines. Paralleling the existing 30-in. line 
will result in adequate system-wide pressures if any portion of the 30-in. 
line on the Virginia side of the Potomac River were to fail. However, if the 
portion of this line suspended beneath Key Bridge were to fail, adequate pres-
sure could not be maintained for fire demands at the Pentagon and National 
Airport. Constructing a new airport feed increases the available fire flow to 
the airport such that ISO requirements are met. Also, this alternative will 
ensure that demands are met at National Airport 
airport feed were to be placed out of service. 
if a segment of the existing 
Closing the Pentagon loop and 
constructing a new Pentagon loop does not drastically improve the performance 
of the FOWM system over the existing system. However, these alternatives do 
increase system reliability by adding new loops and thereby creating 
redundancy. 
152. Although none of the main-strengthening alternatives can, by 
themselves, reduce the effect of an outage of a key FOWM main, combining a 
main-strengthening alternative with a supply alternative may result in a 
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system which can deliver adequate performance under all pipe outage scenarios. 
Selection of Al ternatives 
153. Based on the results of the previous screening process, six sepa-
rate measures to improve reliability were selected for further investigation. 
These include: (a) the 15th and Eads interconnection, (b) the Roosevelt 
Bridge river crossing, (c) the 14th Street Bridge river crossing, (d) the 
booster pump off Low service, (e) the subaqueous river crossing, and (f) the 
new tank at the Navy Annex. 
15th and Eads interconnection 
154. The 15th and Eads interconnection was selected for further exami-
nation because of its ability to supply the FOWM system in the event of an 
emergency. The Fern Street and Airport interconnections also appear capable 
of supplying flow at adequate pressures. All four interconnections are 
hydraulically similar. An assumption was made that the 15th and Eads inter-
connection would be operated during long-term outages, as opposed to the other 
interconnections, because a flowmeter that is part of this interconnection 
allows monitoring of flows between FOWM and Arlington County. 
Roosevelt Bridge crossing 
155. The Roosevelt Bridge crossing was chosen for further evaluation 
because of its ability to serve the FOWM system when the Key Bridge crossing 
is out of service. This alternative does not improve reliability or perfor-
mance when the 30-in. main along George Washington Parkway is closed, yet it 
does meet the primary objective of providing another source of supply. 
14th Street Bridge crossing 
156. Like the previous alternatives, the 14th Street Bridge crossing 
was selected for further investigation because of its ability to supply FOWM 
during a Key Bridge outage. Unlike the Roosevelt Bridge crossing, it affords 
an added measure of reliability by being able to provide adequate system pres-
sure during an outage of the 30-in. steel main along George Washington Park-
way. Furthermore, it allows supply of National Airport during outages of the 
existing airport feed between the Pentagon and the proposed tie-in of this 
alternative. 
Booster pump off Low service 
157. The booster pump alternative was investigated further since it 
83 
also has the capability of supplying system demands during outages of critical 
FOWM lines. Demands at National Airport may be met by this alternative if a 
portion of the airport feed between the Pentagon and the proposed tie-in were 
to fail. 
Subaqueous river crossing 
158. The subaqueous river crossing is also able to supply the FOWM sys-
tem during an outage of the Key Bridge crossing. However, because of the 
location of the tie-in with the existing system, it does not have the capabil-
ity of providing adequate system pressures during an outage of the 30-in. 
steel main along George Washington Parkway. 
New tank a t Navy Annex 
159 . Similar to the previous alternatives, a storage tank at the Navy 
Annex has the ability to supply the FOWM system during an emergency such as 
the Key Bridge outage . Consequently, it was inves tigated further. 
Remaining alternatives 
160 . The Navy Annex and Pentagon heat i ng plant interconnections were 
not investigated further because of their inability to supply the FOWM system 
for an emergency event during periods of high flow. They do appear to be 
f ully capable of supplying water to facilities immediately adjacent to the 
interconnection. As a result, they should be used for such applications and 
not for supply of the entire FOWM network. 
161. The proposed Rosslyn interconnection has also been eliminated from 
further examination because of its inability to supply FOWM during periods of 
high flow . This alternative was to be used as a Key Bridge crossing backup; 
however, high head losses through the Arlington County system during high flow 
periods preclude it s use as a viable a lternative. The new airport intercon-
nec tion was not selected for further examination because its primary use is 
only to supply National Airport, not the entire FOWM system. 
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PART VII: EXTENDED PERIOD EVALUATION OF SELECTED ALTERNATIVES 
162. In addition to the steady-state evaluation performed in the previ-
ous part, each of the selected alternatives was evaluated for a series of 
extended period simulations. The purpose of the extended period analysis is 
to determine the impact of each proposed alternative on the supporting sys-
tems. The supporting system for the 15th and Eads interconnection is the 
Arlington County system, whereas the supporting system for the Roosevelt 
Bridge crossing, 14th Street Bridge crossing, the booster pump off Low ser-
vice, and the subaqueous river crossing i.s the DC system. Such impacts could 
be a reduction of system pressures and an adverse effect on storage tank 
operation in the supporting network. Other detrimental effects to the sup-
porting system are high pipe velocities and excessive hydraulic gradients. 
163. Each alternative was analyzed for three extended period scenarios. 
For each scenario, the fluctuation of the water level in the controlling tank 
was observed as were supporting system pressures and FOWM system pressures. 
Description of Extended Period Scenarios 
First scenario 
164. The first extended period scenario is a 48-hr simulation with 
average daily demands during the first 24 hr and maximum daily demands during 
the next 24 hr. Average daily demands are assumed to follow the pattern shown 
in Figure 34. Maximum daily demands are assumed to follow the same pattern, 
but are 40 percent greater. For this analysis, the Key Bridge river crossing 
is assumed to be out of service. Each simulation was begun at midnight, and 
all storage tanks were assumed to be half full at the start of the simulation. 
Second scenario 
165. The second simulation is similar to the first except that a main 
failure is assumed to occur along the existing 30-in. Key Bridge river cross-
ing and to last for 1 hr at which time the main is shut down. During the hour 
before the main is valved off, water is assumed t o discharge freely from the 
line. Once the main is valved off, it will remain out of service for the 
remainder of the simulation. The parallel 16-in. main remains in service for 
the entire duration of the analysis. Each simulation began at midnight, and 
all storage tanks were assumed to be half full at the start of the simulation. 
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166. The final scenario consisted of three 24-hr simulations with a 
fire demand superimposed over an average daily demand pattern. Fire demands 
were placed at the Pentagon, Washington National Airport, and Fort Myer. The 
variable demand pattern used is shown in Figure 34. A fire demand of 
7,500 gpm for a duration of 4 hr, as specified by ISO requirements, was used 
for the Pentagon and National Airport. A 4-hr fire demand of 2,400 gpm, which 
is the rated capacity of the Fort Myer booster pumps, is also used for the 
military reservation. For this scenario, the 30-in. main under Key Bridge is 
assumed to be out of service. 
167. Each simulation was begun at midnight, and fire demands were 
assumed to begin at noon. This corresponds to the peak demand for the demand 
pattern used. For the purposes of the study, all tanks were assumed to be 
half full at the start of the simulation. At the beginning of each simula-
tion, one pump on each pressure zone was assumed to be operating. If a tank 
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reached a level corresponding to 25-percent full, another pump was placed on 
line. If a tank drained to 15 percent of its capacity, a third pump was 
placed on line. Once a tank regained 15 or 25 percent or its capacity, the 
additional pumps put on line were shut down. Also, if a tank filled to its 
capacity, all pumps at the pumping station were shut down, and the tank was 
allowed to feed the system. 
15th and Eads Interconnection 
First scenario 
168. A 48-hr extended period simulation indicates that the operation of 
the 15th and Eads interconnection adversely affects the operation of the Third 
Gravity tank. With the tank initially half full, operation of the 15th and 
Eads interconnection drains the Third Gravity tank very rapidly. In fact, the 
tank is nearly empty 12 hr into the simulation . Tank levels recover somewhat 
during the next 20 hr, but the tank drains completely 32 hr into the analysis 
and remains empty for the remainder of the simulation. Figure 35 shows the 
variation in tank levels for this scenario. 
169. With the Third Gravity tank empty, the 15th and Eads interconnec-
tion is able to satisfy FOWM system demands at adequate system pressures. 
However, when the tank is empty, average FOWM system pressure is a little 
greater than the 40-psi minimum. Furthermore, draining the Third Gravity tank 
is unacceptable since no emergency and fire storage for the Third Gr avity sys-
tem is available with an empty storage tank. 
Second scenario 
170. A second 48-hr simulation, identical to the previous scenario , was 
performed for the 15th and Eads interconnection alternative except the 30-in. 
line under Key Bridge was taken out of service 1 hr after failing. The 15th 
and Eads interconnection was opened at the same time the 30-in. line was 
closed. Tank levels for this case are shown in Figure 36. 
171. During the 1-hr period before the 30-in. main is valved off , pres-
sures in the FOWM system fall well below acceptable limits, and the Third 
Gravity tank drains a great deal. The 16-in. line augments the supply pro-
vided by the 15th and Eads interconnection once the 30-in. line is closed. 
Nonetheless, tank levels fall soon after the start of the simulation and drop 
to almost empty 37 hr into the analysis. For this scenario, tank levels are 
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unable to recover and never approach half full. Adequate system pressures can 
be maintained in both the FOWM and Third Gravity sys tems for the entire dura-
tion of the scenario once the 30-in. main is closed. 
Third scenario 
172. The impact of a fire in FOWM on the supporting Arlington County 
Third Gravity pressure zone was investigated for two cases: one with the 
16-in. main under Key Bridge in service and one with the 16-in. main out of 
service. For both cases, the 30-in. main under Key Bridge was out of service. 
Fire loadings were placed at the Pentagon, National Airport, and Fort Myer. 
All fires were assumed to be 7, 500 gpm for a duration of 4 hr except the Fort 
Myer fire which was rated at 2,400 gpm also for 4 hr. 
173 . Third Gravity tank levels are adversely affected by connecting the 
FOWM and Arlington County systems through the 15th and Eads inter connection. 
When a 7,500-gpm fire is placed at the Pentagon, the Third Gravity tank emp-
ties if the Key Bridge river cross ing is in service. Tank levels are unable 
to reach half full even after the fire demand is removed. Figure 37 shows the 
Third Gravity tank levels for this scenario. 
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174. Not only are tank levels adversely affected by a fire at the Pen-
t agon, but FOWM system pressures are also. Because the single 24- and 16-in. 
airport feed is the only flow route, high head losses are generated in this 
line. As a result, average system pressures are not acceptable. Pressures in 
the Third Gravity pressure zone are low, but generally they are above 40 ps i. 
175. Tank operation for a fire demand at National Airport is very simi-
lar to that of a fire at the Pentagon. Like the previous scenario, the Third 
Gravity tank empties with a 7,500-gpm fire demand placed at the airport. Fig-
ure 38 illustrates the tank operation for this case. 
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176. Both FOWM and Arlington County system pressures are adversely 
affected by an airport fire demand. Again, because a large amount of flow is 
f orced through a single pipe, large head losses are generated, and, as a 
result, system pressures are reduced to levels below acceptable. Even with 
the 16-in. line in service, pressures east of I-95 are below the design 
criteria. 
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177. Third Gravity tank levels are also influenced by a f ire demand at 
Fort Myer. Even though the fire demand is of a lesser magnitude than the pre-
vious l oadings, the Third Gravity tank still empties if no supply is offered 
from Dalecarlia First High. Tank operation is improved somewhat if the 16-in. 
line under Key Bridge contributes flow. Yet, tank levels are unable to reach 
the same levels as at the start of the simulation. Figure 39 shows tank 
fluctuations for this scenario. 
178 . Unlike the previous fire loadings, system pressures within the 
FOWM system can be maintained above standard for either case with the 16-in. 
Key Bridge crossing in or out of service with a fire demand at Fort Myer. 
Likewise, Arlington County Third Gravity pressures are kept above minimum. 
New River Crossings 
179. The Roosevelt Bridge, 14th Street Bridge, and Subaqueous River 
Crossing alternatives are very similar physically and hydraulical l y, and as a 
result, they provide nearly identical results. The three alternatives origi-
nate at the Foxhall Reservoir, consist of a length of 30-in. main, and connect 
with the existing FOWM system. The major differences between the alternatives 
are lengths of pipe associated with each alternative and the location of the 
tie-in with FOWM. 
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Foxhall Tank 
180. The Roosevelt Bridge, 14th Street, and Subaqueous River Crossing 
alternatives were analyzed for an extended period case consisting of an aver-
age daily demand pattern for 24 hr followed by a maximum daily demand pattern 
for the next 24 hr. The Key Bridge crossing was out of service for the entire 
duration of the simulation. Pumps were placed on-line if the Foxhall tank 
reached 25 percent of its capacity, and a third pump was placed on-line if the 
tank drained to 15 percent of its capacity. Once Foxhall tank regained 
15 percent of its volume, a pump was taken off-line. Similarly, once the tank 
filled to 25 percent of its capacity, the other pump was shut down. 
181. Hydraulic analysis indicates that proposed river crossings have no 
adverse impacts on the controlling Foxhall tank and DC First High system. 
Tank operation appears normal since Foxhall tank never completely drains or 
completely fills. However, this analysis was based on the assumption that 
pumps can be placed on-line or taken off-line at the Dalecarlia Pump Station 
as tanks near empty or full. 
First scenario 
182. For the average daily demand followed by maximum daily demand 
scenario, levels in Foxhall tank never fall below half full, which indicates 
adequate pumping capacity for average daily loadings. The tank trajectory for 
this case is the same for all three river crossing alternatives and is shown 
in Figure 40. System pressures also remain adequate for all alternatives 
although average pressures vary between each alternative. This is due to 
additional head loss associated with longer lengths of pipe. 
Second scenario 
183. A second scenario evaluated for the Roosevelt Bridge, 14th Street 
Bridge, and Subaqueous River Crossing alternatives was a case with average 
daily demand followed by maximum daily demand with failure of the existing 
30-in. main under Key Bridge at the start of the simulation. The tank trajec-
tory for this scenario is shown in Figure 41. 
184. During this simulation, average system pressures fall below 
acceptable standards during the first hour of the event. This corresponds to 
the time when the 30-in. steel main is freely discharging approximately 
70,000 gpm. Tank levels also drop about 5 ft until the main is valved off. 
Once the break is isolated, system pressures remain well above minimum. Also, 
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the Foxhall tank is able to recover , and levels remain above half full for the 
remainder of the simulation. 
Third scenario 
185. The final scenario was a 24- hr average daily demand simulation 
with fire demands placed at the Pentagon, National Airport , and Fort Myer. 
The same fire loadings used in the steady- state analysis were used for the 
extended period analysis and were assumed to begin at noon and last for 4 hr. 
This analysis assumed the existing 30- in. main under Key Bridge was out of 
service and was repeated with t he 16- in. main under Key Bridge in service and 
out of service. 
186. Foxhall tank operation is not adversely affected during this 
scenario. As would be expected, levels begin to drop at the start of the fire 
loading and drop throughout the duration of the fire . Levels are able to 
recover as additional pumps are put on line, and the tank is nearly full at 
the end of the simulation. Tank trajectories for each of the alternatives are 
the same with the 16- in. line open or closed for the fire demand scenario 
since tank level for this case is a function of demand and not path of flow . 
Trajectories for each fire loading condition are shown in Figures 42-44 . 
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187. Average system pressures do appear to suffer during fire demand 
loading conditions. For a fire placed at the Pentagon, the Roosevelt Bridge 
and Subaqueous River Crossing alternatives provide adequate system-wide pres-
sures for the entire duration of the fire. This is true whether the existing 
16-in. main under Key Bridge is in service or not. The 14th Street Bridge 
alternative can also maintain adequate system pressures with a fire at the 
Pentagon if the 16-in. line remains in service. If this pipe were closed, the 
14th Street river crossing, by itself, could not maintain adequate system 
pressures with a 7,500-gpm fire at the Pentagon. This is due to very large 
line losses in the 24- and 16-in. line between the proposed 14th Street tie-in 
with FOWM and the location of the fire demand • 
• 188. For a fire of the same magnitude as the Pentagon fire located at 
National Airport, none of the three river crossing alternatives could provide 
adequate system-wide pressures. Pressures at locations north of I-95 can be 
maintained above standard; however, pressures east of I-95 fall drastically 
below the minimum. Pressures are reduced by high head losses in the single 
24- and 16-in. airport feed. It is quite possible that a river crossing 
coupled with a main-strengthening alternative could adequately supply the FOWM 
system with acceptable pressures and flow during all loading conditions . 
189. For a fire loading of 2,400 gpm for a duration of 4 hr located at 
Fort Myer, all river crossing alternatives can maintain adequate system-wide 
pressures. 
Brentwood Tank 
190. Another river crossing alternative which was analyzed for its 
effect on a supporting network was the Booster Pump Off Low Service alterna-
tive. The supporting system for this case is the DC Low service area. The 
controlling tank for this analysis was the Brentwood Reservoir. Like the pre-
vious alternatives, pumps were placed on-line as needed if Brentwood Reservoir 
drained to 25 or 15 percent of its capacity. Unlike the previous alterna-
tives, however, pumps at both the Dalecarlia and Bryant Street pumping sta-
tions were assumed to operate if tank levels dictated such. The booster pump 
was assumed to operate at all times. It is possible, however, with this 
alternative to operate the booster pump only as needed when pressures within 
the FOWM system fall below acceptable limits. 
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First scenario 
191. For the case with average daily demands followed by maximum daily 
demands, the Brentwood tank is somewhat adversely affected by a booster pump 
supplying the FOWM system. Tank levels do fall a bit below half f ull near the 
end of the average daily loading, but once an additional pump is placed 
on-line, tank levels quickly recover . However, t ank levels do fall below half 
full near the end of the maximum daily loading pattern. System pressures are 
above acceptable limits for the entire duration of this analysis. Tank levels 
for this scenario are shown in Figure 45. 
Second scenario 
192. For the scenario with average daily demands followed by maximum 
daily demands and a 30-in. Key Bridge main break 1 hr into the simulation, 
Brentwood tank levels are affected to a greater degree than the first 
scenario. Tank levels do not drop any during the first hour of the simulation 
as is the case in the previous alternatives. However, tank levels do drain a 
great deal near the end of the maximum daily loading. Levels do recover to 
some extent once a pump is placed on-line. System pressures fall well below 
design standards immediately after the 30-in. line has failed. However, once 
the break is isolated, system pressures remain above acceptable levels. Tank 
levels for this scenario are shown in Figure 46. 
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Third scenario 
193. Operation of the Brentwood tank was evaluated for fire demands 
placed at the Pentagon, National Airport, and Fort Myer. For each fire 
demand, a simulation was made for two cas es: one with the 16-in. Key Bridge 
river crossing open and one with the 16-in. Key Bridge line closed. For each 
of the simulations, the 30-in. Key Bridge river crossing was closed, and the 
booster pump was operating f or the entire duration of the simulation. 
194. For each of the fire demands, the Brentwood tank level trajectory 
is essentially the same. Tank levels gradually increase to near full at which 
time all pumps are shut down. Once all pumps are taken off-line, the tank 
level drops suddenly to half full whether the 16-in. Key Bridge main is open 
or closed. Tank levels are able to recover once another pump at Dalecarlia 
and Bryant Street pump stations is placed on-line. At the end of the sim-
ulation, however, tank levels are near half full for the case where all supply 
is provided from the booster pump. System pressures fall below acceptable 
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values during fire demands due to large line losses within FOWM. The tank 
trajectories for scenario are shown in Figures 47-49. 
New Tank at Navy Annex 
First scenario 
195. The scenarios used to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
1.8-MG tank at the Navy Annex were modified somewhat from the previous alter-
native. The water level in the tank was observed for three cases consisting 
of a 48-hr simulation with an average daily demand pattern followed by a maxi-
mum daily demand pattern and different conditions of the Key Bridge river 
crossing. Tank levels were observed for a case with the entire Key Bridge 
river crossing in service, the 30-in. main Key Bridge crossing out of service, 
and the entire Key Bridge out of service. The water level in the Navy Annex 
tank was initially set half full. 
196. As Figure 50 indicates, the tank level fluctuates, but the tank 
never drains completely with the Key Bridge river crossing in service. 
indicates proper operation of the tank as it is able to fill and drain. 
This 
If 
the tank level were to remain constant for a significant amount of time (a few 
days), this would be undesirable as chlorine residuals would more than likely 
fall below acceptable limits. On the other hand, if the tank were to empty, 
this too would be undesirable as no storage could be provided. The tank at 
Navy Annex, as proposed, will retain at least 20 percent of its rated capacity 
at all times with the Key Bridge crossing on-line. However, if the 30-in. Key 
Bridge main or the entire Key Bridge crossing were lost, the proposed tank 
could not supply FOWM demands for very long. The tank empties about 14 hr 
into the simulation with the 30-in. line closed and drains completely i n 8 hr 
if the entire bridge crossing is out. 
Second scenario 
197. A second scenario investigated the performance of the Navy Annex 
tank for fire demands placed at the Pentagon, National Airport, and Fort Myer . 
The magnitude and duration of the fire event were the same as the previous 
analyses. An assumption was made that DC First High pumps could be placed 
on-line or taken off-line as necessary if the tank approached empty or full. 
The analysis was repeated for the Key Bridge river crossing in service, the 
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30-in. line under Key Bridge out of service, and the entire river crossing out 
of service. 
198. For a fire placed at the Pentagon, the 30-in. supply main under 
Key Bridge must remain in service in order to keep the proposed Navy Annex 
tank from emptying. With the Key Bridge crossing in service, the tank begins 
to drain after the start of the fire and reaches a low level of 7.5 ft. At 
this time, an additional pump at the Dalecarlia Pump Station is placed on-line 
and the tank begins to fill. Adequate system pressures are maintained at all 
times during the scenario. 
199. When the 30-in. line under Key Bridge is taken out of service, the 
existing 16-in. supply line and proposed Navy tank can satisfy system demands 
at adequate pressures up to the start of the fire loading. Without the 30-in. 
steel main, the proposed tank will empty 1 hr after the fire begins at which 
point system pressures cannot be maintained above standard. This is due to 
excessive losses in the existing 16-in. supply line associated with high 
flows. Consequently, the fire demand cannot be met. Tank levels do, however, 
begin to recover, and system pressures are acceptable once the fire load is 
removed. 
200. If the entire Key Bridge river crossing were to be taken out of 
service, the only source of supply for the FOWM system would be the proposed 
tank at Navy Annex. If the tank were half full at the start of the simula-
tion, it could only supply the system for 8 hr before completely draining. 
Supply would last for 14 hr if the tank were full at the start of the simula-
tion. In either case, the tank could not supply fire demands with the Key 
Bridge river crossing out as it would empty prior to the start of the fire. 
Figure 51 illustrates the tank trajectories with a fire loading at the Penta-
gon for the three cases analyzed. 
201. When a 7-hr, 7,500-gpm fire demand is placed at Washington 
National Airport, the proposed Navy Annex tank behaves much the same way as 
during a Pentagon fire. In fact, tank trajectories for the three fire loading 
scenarios (Key Bridge in, 30 in. out, Key Bridge out) are mostly the same for 
both the Pentagon and National Airport fire demands. Figure 52 shows the 
variation in tank levels for the three cases during a fire at National 
Airport. 
202. For each of the three scenarios, system pressures fall below 
acceptable limits east of I-95 for an airport fire. The tank at the Navy 
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Figure 51. Navy Annex tank levels for fire at Pentagon 
losses generated between the source (Key Bridge crossing, Navy Annex tank) and 
the demand (airport fire). The excessive line losses are due to a large 
amount of flow funneled through the single airport feed. 
203. As with the previous fire loadings, the 30-in. supply main under 
Key Bridge must remain in service when a fire is located at Fort Myer; other-
wise, the proposed Navy Annex tank will drain. With the Key Bridge crossing 
in service at all times, the tank level will never approach empty . With the 
30-in. steel main off-line, the tank empties 14 hr after the start of the 
fire. When the Key Bridge is out of service, the tank will empty in 5 hr if 
Annex does not help to boost pressures in this area because of high head half 
full at the beginning of the simulation. Figure 53 shows the tank trajector y 
for a fire demand placed at Fort Myer. 
204. Adequate system pressures can be maintained at all times with a 
fire at Fort Myer. Even when the Navy Annex tank is empty and the 30-in. line 
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under Key Bridge i s out, adequate system-wide pressures can be supported by 
the existing 16-in. line for the entire duration of the simula tion. 
Summary 
205. Several alternatives designed t o improve t he reliability of the 
FOWM system were evaluated for extended period simulations to determine the 
magnitude of impact each alternative has on the supporting network. Such 
i mpacts are an adverse effect on storage tank operation in the supporting sys-
tem or unacceptable pressures in either the supporting network or the FOWM 
system. The alternatives examined include the 15th and Eads interconnec tion, 
the Roosevelt Bridge crossing , the 14th Street Bridge crossing, the Booster 
Pump Off Low service alternative, the subaqueous river c rossing, and a new 
s t orage tank at the Navy Annex. 
206. Extended operation of the 15th and Eads interconnection has a 
detrimenta l effect on the Third Gravity tank. For each scenario evaluated, 
the Third Gravity tank either drains completely or comes dangerously close to 
empty. An empty storage tank is unacceptable since no emergency storage or 
fire-fighting capacity is available. Minimum ISO requirements state that 
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Figure 53. Navy Annex tank levels for fire at Fort Myer 
storage tanks should contain a certain amount of water at all times, prefera-
bly a 24-hr supply for average daily demands. It is unlikely Arlington County 
would continue to allow FOWM to be supplied through the 15th and Eads inter-
connection if the Third Gravity tank drains close to empty. The Fern Stree t 
and Crystal City interconnections would have this same effect on the Third 
Gravity tank since all three interconnections are hydraulically similar. 
207. Foxhall tank levels are not adversely affected by the Roosevelt 
Bridge, 14th Street, or Subaqueous River Crossing alternatives. Even though 
tank levels at times approach half full, putting another pump on-line quickly 
remedies the situation, and the tank is able to refill. Foxhall tank does 
drain a great deal if the 30-in. Key Bridge crossing breaks, but tank levels 
are able to recover once additional pumps are operated. 
208. The Booster Pump Off Low Service alternative also appears to have 
a negative effect on the Brentwood Reservoir but not to the degree of the 
previous alternative. With average daily demands followed by maximum daily 
demands, tank levels fall below half full near the end of the maximum daily 
loading condition. Tank levels are able to recover once pumps at Dalecarlia 
and Bryant Street are placed on-line; however, tank levels remain less than 
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half full at the end of the simulation. With FOWM fire demands supplied 
entirely by Brentwood Reservoir, tank levels fall below half full near the end 
of the scenario. 
209. The new tank at Navy Annex proposal can help augment supply from 
the Key Bridge river crossing during periods of peak demand or fire loading. 
The tank cannot, by itself, adequately supply the FOWM system without the 
30-in. Key Bridge crossing or an alternate means of supply in service. 
\ 
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PART VIII: ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT OF SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS 
Assessment Criteria 
210. In addition to evaluating the hydraulic performance of each alter-
native, an attempt was made to assess the engineering impacts of each sce-
nario. Potential impacts have been grouped into five different categories. 
Each category is identified below: 
a. Difficulty of construction. 
b. Difficulty of access. 
c. Component reliability. 
d. System dependency. 
e. Energy efficiency. 
A summary of each category is provided in the following paragraphs. 
Difficulty of construction 
211. Difficulty of construction describes the potential for encounter-
ing problems during installation of the alternative. Such difficulties could 
be drilling rock instead of blasting, deep trenching in poor soils, construc-
tion in swampy areas, presence of existing utilities, etc . These difficulties 
are considered as negative impacts which have the net effect of increasing the 
cost of the alternative. 
212. One construction difficulty which is peculiar to the DC area is 
the presence of national park lands. Most of the alternatives involving new 
construction pass through national park land (areas) as a great deal of FOWM 
is itself national park land. Disturbance to the area must be kept at an 
absolute minimum, and any land which is disturbed must be returned to its 
exact original condition. The end result may be a cost several times higher 
than the estimated cost of other alternatives. 
Difficulty of access 
213. Difficulty of access refers to the difficulty of access to the 
construction site. Such constraints may be physical or regulatory. An exam-
ple of such would be construction of the actual bridge crossing on the Roose-
velt and 14th Street Bridge River crossing alternatives. Work in these areas 
must take place in limited space since traffic over the bridges would have t o 
be maintained at all times. Alternatively, access to construction on Federal 
park lands may be limited by regulatory constraints. It is anticipated that 
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increased construction costs will be associated with those projects which have 
high degrees of difficulty of access. Difficulty of access and difficulty of 
construction are somewhat related. 
Component reliability 
214. Component reliability refers to the individual reliability of a 
proposed alternative. For example, a proposed river crossing may be more sus-
ceptible to failure than an existing or proposed interconnection on land. As 
a result, the interconnections may have a greater component reliability than a 
proposed river crossing. 
System dependency 
215. Sys tem dependency describes the extent to which a particular 
alterna tive is dependent upon another system. Some alternatives are more 
dependent than others for proper hydraulic performance. For instance, both 
the Roosevelt Bridge crossing and 15th and Eads interconnection could supply 
the FOWM system in most cases if the Key Bridge river crossing were placed out 
of service. The Roosevelt Bridge Crossing alternative relies on trouble-free 
operation of the Dalecarlia water plant and Foxhall tank to deliver flow at 
adequate pressures to the FOWM system. 
216. The 15th and Eads interconnection, on the other hand, not only 
relies on problem-free operation of the Dalecarlia plant and Third High reser-
voir, but also on the Third Gravity tank and PRV's between First, Second, and 
Third Gravity pressure zones. Furthermore, the 15th and Eads interconnection 
is more sensitive to demand loadings in Third Gravity than the Roosevelt 
Bridge crossing is to loadings in DC First High. 
Energy efficiency 
217. Energy efficiency refers to the relative energy efficiency of each 
alternative. For example, use of water from the First High pressure zone via 
the new river crossings is much more efficient than the use of water from the 
Third High pressure zone via the 15th and Eads interconnection. If the FOWM 
system were to be supplied through the 15th and Eads interconnection, water 
must first be pumped to Arlington County First Gravity from the DC Third High 
pressure zone at a grade of approximately 420 ft. Water then flows to Second 
Gravity and to Third Gravity passing through PRV's between each Arlington 
County pressure zone at which point it reaches FOWM at a hydraulic grade of 
about 200 ft. This has the net effect of pumping water to a certain height 
and passing it through energy dissipaters to get it to a lower height at 
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acceptable pressures. If, on the other hand, FOWM were to be supplied via a 
new river crossing connected to DC First High, then water would not have to be 
pumped to such a high grade to adequately supply the FOWM system. 
Engineering Impacts Evaluation 
218. For this analysis, all impacts are considered negative. The 
degree of engineering impact has been ranked on a numerical scale of 0 to 5 as 
shown in Table 10. The engineering impacts of each supply alternative are 
summarized in Table 11. The engineering impacts of each main-strengthening 
are shown in Table 12. 
Supply Alternatives 
15th and Eads interconnection 
219. Since the 15th and Eads interconnection is an existing alterna-
tive, the engineering impacts of difficulty of construction and difficulty of 
access have been assigned a value of zero. This indicates that there are no 
negative impacts associated with the construction and access category. 
220. The component reliability of this alternative is minimal since it 
consists of pipes, valves, and a meter. Although any of these appurtenances 
could fail, the number of parts (relative to the remaining alternatives) has 
been kept to a minimum. 
Numerical Ranking 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Table 10 
Assessment Scale 
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Degree of 
Engineering Impact 
None 
Minimal 
Slight 
Moderate 
Major 
Extreme 
Table ll 
Engineering Impacts of Supply Alternatives* 
14th New 
Roosevelt Street Booster Tank 
15th Bridge Bridge Pump Subaqueous at 
and Eads River River off Low River Navy . 
Assessment Category Interconnec tion Crossing Crossing Service Cr ossing Annex 
Difficult y of constr:ucd.on 0 3 3 2 4 1 
Difficulty of access 0 3 3 3 4 5 
Component reliability 1 1 1 2 1 1 
System dependency 5 1 1 1 1 2 
Energy efficiency 4 0 0 1 0 0 
-
Total 10 8 8 9 10 9 
* Numerical rankings are described in Table 10. 
221. System dependency of the 15th and Eads Interconnection alternative 
is extreme since it relies entirely on proper operation of the Third Gravity 
pressure zone in Arlington County. In turn, proper operation of Third Gravity 
is dependent upon proper operation of Second Gravity, First Gravity, and DC 
Third High. Since it is located at the end of the Arlington County DC net-
work, the 15th and Eads interconnection could be affected by an emergency in 
any of the previously mentioned pressure zones. 
222. The 15th and Eads interconnection has been assigned a value of 
four for energy efficiency which corresponds to a major negative impact. 
Before water reaches FOWM through the 15th and Eads interconnection, it has 
been pumped to a grade of about 420 ft from DC Third High. In order to reach 
Third Gravity a t acceptable pressures, water must flow through two sets of 
PRV's which reduce the amount of energy contained by the fluid. This is a 
waste of energy which could be avoided with other alternatives. The engineer-
ing impacts of the Fern Street and Crystal City interconnections are the same 
as the 15th and Eads Interconnection alternative. 
Roosevelt Bridge river crossing 
223. The Roosevelt Bridge River Crossing alternative, relative to the 
remaining alternatives, has been assigned a moderate engineering impact in the 
difficulty of construction category. Although it is difficult to estimate 
construction conditions without a detailed survey or rock soundings, this 
alternative does pass through national park lands. Park service officials may 
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Table 12 
Engineering Impacts of Main- Strengthening Alternatives* 
Paralleling 
30- in. FOWM Closing Constructing 
Tr ansmission New Airport Pentagon New 
Assessment Category Main Feed Loop Pentagon Loop 
Difficulty of construction 2 3 3 l 
Difficulty of access 3 2 2 1 
Component reliability 1 1 1 1 
System dependency 0 0 0 0 
Energy efficiency 0 0 0 0 
----
---- ----
Total 6 6 6 3 
* Numerical rankings are described in Table 10. 
be reluctant to grant permission to install a pipe through these areas. If 
permission were granted , dis turbance to these lands would have to be kept to a 
minimum, and any disturbed land would have to be restored t o its exact orig-
inal condition. 
224. Difficulty of access of the Roosevelt Bridge crossing is also 
moderate relative to the other supply alternatives. With this proposal, 
approximately 4,000 ft of 30-in. main must be installed on the Roosevelt 
Bridge. Traffic over the structure is at times quite heavy and must be con-
tinuously maintained. This, in turn, acts to limjt available space on the 
bridge which is initially at a premium. Also, since this alternative passes 
through Federal areas, permission to construct may be difficult to obtain. 
225. Component reliability of this alternative is minimal s ince it is 
comprised of pipes and valves. Similar to the 15th and Eads Interconnection 
alternative, the Roosevelt Bridge crossing is not immune to failure; however, 
compared with the other alternatives, the probability of failure is minimal. 
226. This alternative has minimal system dependency relative to the 
other supply alternatives. Under this proposal, the Roosevelt Bridge river 
crossing would extend from the Foxhall Reservoir across the Potomac River to 
FOWM. As a result, this alternative is dependent upon the DC First High sys-
tem. However, the existing Key Bridge crossing is also dependent upon DC 
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First High. Consequently, this alternative has been assigned a value of one 
in the system dependency category. 
227. The Roosevelt Bridge river crossing has no negative engineering 
impacts in the energy efficiency category. This crossing would be supplied 
from the DC First High pressure zone. The existing Key Bridge river crossing 
is also supplied from DC First High. Short of gravity flow, this is the most 
efficient method of supplying the FOWM system under existing conditions. Most 
of FOWM can be supplied by gravity from DC Low service which would result in a 
more efficient alternative; however, pressures at higher elevations are such 
that demands at these locations could not be met. As a result, gravity flow 
from DC Low service is an unsuitable alternative. 
14th Street Bridge river crossing 
228. The 14th Street Bridge river crossing has an engineering assess-
ment very similar to that of the Roosevelt Bridge crossing. Difficulty of 
construction and difficulty of access have been assigned moderate engineering 
impacts for the same reasons. The 14th Street Bridge River Crossing alter-
native, however, does travel through more national park land than the 
Roosevelt Bridge River crossing alternative. 
229. This alternative has the same degree of impact in the component 
reliability and system dependency categories as the previous alternative, 
again for the same reasons. In fact, the only difference between the two 
alternatives, besides location of the river crossing, is the length of pipe 
involved. This may contribute more of an impact to component reliability than 
the Roosevelt crossing. The energy efficiency of the 14th Street Bridge 
crossing has no negative engineering impacts as compared to the other supply 
alternatives. 
Booster pump off Low service 
230. The Booster Pump Off Low Service alternative has a lower degree of 
construction difficulty than the Roosevelt Bridge or 14th Street Bridge 
crossings because this proposal does not travel through national park lands to 
the same degree as the previous alternatives. Some park land is traversed, 
however, so a slight degree of impact has been assigned. 
231. Difficulty of access is moderate since a pipe construction on 
14th Street Bridge must be undertaken. Space is limited on the bridge, traf-
fic over the bridge must be maintained, and construction must take place 
either on the bridge or from a barge in the Potomac River. 
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232. Component reliability with respect to the other alternatives is 
slight since this alternative primarily consists of pipes and valves. Unlike 
the other supply alternatives, this proposal involves a booster pump. The 
booster pump contributes another degree of negative impact since the pump adds 
more moving parts to the alternative, which in turn adds more components upon 
which the alternative relies. 
233. The Booster Pump Off Low Service alternative depends upon proper 
operation of the Low service pressure zone. Like the Roosevelt Bridge and 
14th Street Bridge River Crossing alternatives, the booster pump alternative 
is dependent upon another system and hence is assigned a minimal system 
dependency . 
234 . The energy efficiency impact of the booster pump alternative has 
been rated as minimal. Even though the combined head of the Low service pumps 
and the booster pump is equal to the head of the DC First High pumps, the 
First High pumps are in place and would not have to be operated any differ-
ently than they are now in order for the Roosevelt Bridge, 14th Street Bridge, 
and subaqueous river crossing to work. The booster pump alternative, on the 
other hand, would require operation of an additional pump. For this reason, 
the energy impact has been assigned a value of one. 
Subaqueous river crossing 
235. The subaqueous river crossing is much like the Roosevelt Bridge 
and 14th Street Bridge River Crossing alternatives from the perspective of 
negative engineering impacts. The difficulty of construction has been rated 
as major since this alternative not only traverses national park lands but 
also involves an underwater pipe installation. Subaqueous pipeline installa-
tion will require divers to accomplish some underwater construction. For this 
reason and the fact that park land is involved merits a major negative impact 
rating. 
236. The difficulty of access is also aggravated by the underwater con-
struction. Furthermore, a trench installation is proposed for a segment of 
this link crossing Roosevelt Island. Again, this involves national park land 
for which permission to construct may be difficult to obtain. As a result, 
moderate difficulty of access is anticipated . 
237 . The subaqueous river crossing is similar t o the Roosevelt Bridge 
and 14th Street Bridge crossings in the remaining engineering impact cate-
gories. This alternative involves the use of pipes and valves; therefore, 
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component reliability is minimal. System dependency is also minimal since 
this alternative only depends upon proper operation of DC First High. 
Finally, there are no energy impacts since the crossing is supplied from DC 
First High. 
New tank at Navy Annex 
238 . The New Navy Annex Tank alternative has been evaluated for the 
same negative engineering impacts at the other supply alternatives. The dif-
ficulty of construction of this alternative is minimal since only a very small 
amount of land will be disturbed. The proposed site of the tank is the Navy 
Annex, which appears to have the available land for such a structure. 
239. Difficulty of access for the proposed Navy Annex tank is rated at 
extreme. Washington Aqueduct officials have indicated that opposition to 
storage tanks in the area surrounding the Navy Annex is very strong, and it is 
highly unlikely such a tank would obtain public approval. For this reason, 
the engineering impact has been assigned a value of five. 
240. The component reliability of a Navy Annex tank is minimal with 
respect to the other supply alternatives since this alternative, like many of 
the previous alternatives, only involves pipes and valves. The system depen-
dency, on the other hand, has been assigned a value of two. Not only is the 
tank dependent upon proper operation of the DC First High system but also upon 
proper operation of the FOWM network. If either of the systems experiences a 
serious emergency, proper operation may be affected. The energy efficiency of 
the tank experiences no negative impacts since it is hydraulically connected 
to DC First High. 
Main-Strengthening Alternatives 
Paralleling 30-in. main 
24 1. Difficulty of construction for paralleling the 30-in. FOWM trans-
mission main has been rated slight with respect to the other main-
strengthening alternatives. Construction will either be in or along the 
Jefferson Davis Highway for most of its length; plus construction must take 
place in national park land areas. Although construction may not be that dif-
ficult, these facts contribute to slightly negative engineering impacts. 
242. Access to a suitable pipeline route may also be difficult to 
obtain since the alternative is located in park areas for a substantial 
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portion of its length. Compared with the remaining pipeline alternatives, 
this alternative has been assigned a value of three for difficulty of access. 
243. The component reliability of the Paralleling 30-in. Main alterna-
tive is minimal since this proposal only involves pipes and valves. The num-
ber of moving parts is kept to a minimum. The system dependency and energy 
efficiency of this alternative, with respect to the remaining main-
strengthening alternatives, are nonexistent. 
New airport feed 
244. The negative engineering impacts for the New Airport Feed alterna-
tive are in most respects very similar to the previous alternative. Diffi-
culty of construction is moderate since this alternative involves construc-
tion, not in park lands but in a congested urban area. A good deal of 
construction must take place in Crystal City, which is an urban setting. 
Presence of existing utilities may contribute to construction difficulty. 
245. Unlike the previous alternative, access to this alternative may 
not be as diffict1lt to obtain since only a small amount of national park land 
is involved. As a result, compared with the other main construction alterna-
tives, only slight engineering impacts are expected. 
246. This alternative is identical to the previous alternative in the 
component reliability, system dependency, and energy efficiency categories. 
As a result, the same impacts have been assigned to both alternatives. 
Closing Pentagon loop 
247. This alternative has been rated as moderately difficult to con-
struct compared with the other alternatives. Presently, a segment of main 
circling the Pentagon is crushed and placed out of service; therefore, the 
loop is broken . This line is buried very deeply adjacent to the Pentagon. 
Repairing or replacing this segment of main merits a moderate rating. 
248. Access to this alternative should not be as dif ficult to obtain as 
the paralleling alternative since little or no national park land is involved. 
However, construction will take place very close to the Pentagon. Construc-
tion may, to some degree, affect normal operation of the facility. As a 
result, a slightly negative impact has been given. 
249. This alternative, like the previous main-strengthening alterna-
tives, does not involve any negative system dependency or energy efficiency 
impacts. Component reliability impacts are minimal s ince only pipes and 
valves are involved. 
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Constructing new Pentagon loop 
250. Installing a new loop near the Pentagon will result in only mini-
mal construction difficulty since the area is not in national park areas nor 
adjacent to any roadways. Construction would occur in a parking lot which 
would present minor construction and access difficulty. This project also 
presents minimal component reliability since it only involves pipes and 
valves. Like the previous main-strengthening alternatives, no system depen-
dency or energy efficiency impacts are expected. 
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PART IX: ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS 
Evaluation Procedure 
251. Another criterion for evaluating each alternative was cost. A 
four-step process was used to calculate construction costs for the proposed 
alternatives. The steps consisted of selecting the construction categories, 
developing unit costs for the categories chosen, determining the quantity of 
each type of construction within each route, and adding the products of the 
unit costs and the quantities assigned to each route to ascertain the con-
struction cost. 
Construction Categories 
252. Based on a 1979 study for the Baltimore District by Hayes, Seay, 
Mattern and Mattern Engineers, seven different cons truction categories were 
chosen to reflect the various degrees of diff iculty and types of construction 
to be encountered. The construction categories selected for finished water 
pipeline construction are as follows: 
a. Open area. The construction category for open areas refers to 
construction in open space or undeveloped land with ample room 
for materials and equipment. Trench construction is used for 
all lines with proper bedding, graveling, and at least 4 ft of 
cover placed over all pipes. Limited use of trench sheeting 
may be used in open area construction. 
b. Open area road. This category refers to construction in roads 
which contain few existing utilities and are not heavily 
traveled. Roadway repaving, traffic maintenance, traffic 
control devices, and trench sheeting for 36-in. and larger 
pipelines may be required for construction falling into this 
category. 
c. Urban area. Urban area construction occurs in built-up urban 
areas which contain many existing utilities and structures. 
Deeper than normal excavation with the use of trench sheeting 
and relocation of existing utilities may be required. 
d. Urban area street. Urban area street construction is s imilar 
to urban area construction in that activity may take place in 
urban streets which contain many existing utilities and 
require deeper than normal excavation , trench sheeting, and/or 
relocation of existing utilities. Unlike urban area construc-
tion, urban area street construction also involves roadway 
repaving and traffic control. 
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e. Highway (primary/interstate) and railroad crossings. This 
category involves construction of pipeline crossings of major 
transportation routes, assuming that a casing pipe will be 
required. For 24-in. and smaller pipelines, a steel casing 
pipe would be jacked under the road or railroad and filled 
with grout. For pipelines larger than 24 in., a linear plate 
tunnel would be constructed. 
f. Bridge crossing. The bridge crossing construction category 
encompasses all pipeline construction occurring on a bridge 
structure. Pipe may either be secured to the side of the 
structure or suspended beneath the bridge. Maintenance of 
traffic is required at all times during bridge construction. 
£· Subaqueous river crossing. This construction category 
involves construction in the banks and bed of the Potomac 
River. This category is only applicable to a subaqueous river 
crossing and involves underwater trenching and/or concrete 
placement. Ball and socket pipe is used for the river 
crossing, whereas other suitable pipe materials may be used 
for land construction. 
Unit Costs 
253. Unit costs for all six construction categories are summarized in 
Table 13 for a range of pipe diameters. These costs were based on estimates 
developed in two recent studies: "Arlington County Water System Study" by 
Montgomery Engineers of Virginia (1980) and "Development of Engineering and 
Cost Data for Finished and Raw Water Interconnections" by Hayes, Seay, Mattern 
and Mattern Engineers (1979). All costs were updated to the present using a 
December 1987 Engineering News Record Construction Cost Index of 4464. 
Capital Construction Costs 
254. The capital construction costs for the six supply alternatives and 
the four_ main-strengthening alternatives are shown in Appendix C. Each alter-
native was analyzed to determine how much of the alternative would fall into a 
given construction category. The costs were computed by multiplying the unit 
cost of a given construction category and the length of pipe which could be 
expected to be installed under the conditions of the category. Overhead and 
profit amounting to 15 percent of the capital cost were added to find the 
estimated cost of the alternative. The estimated cost of each alternative is 
provided in Table 14. 
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Table 13 
Unit Costs 
Summary of Unit Costs for Indicated 
Pi:ee Diameter, $/lin ft 
Construction Category 12 in. 16 in. 20 in. 24 in. 30 in. 36 in. 
Open area 49 54 70 78 104 129 
Open area road 68 76 98 109 140 170 
Urban area 114 126 163 181 218 254 
Urban area street 133 148 191 212 253 294 
Highway and 300 334 431 478 724 969 
railroad crossing 
Bridge crossing 421 465 603 705 1,065 1,427 
Subaqueous river 450 500 750 1,000 1,540 2,000 
crossing 
Energy Costs 
255. Water supplied through the 15th and Eads interconnection will cost 
significantly more than water supplied through the existing and alternative 
river crossings in terms of increased energy costs. Water for the intercon-
nections is supplied from the Third High pressure zone while the water for the 
river crossings is supplied from the First High pressure zone. The relative 
cost of water from each pressure zone may be estimated on a unit f low basis 
using the following equation: 
where 
kgal- 1,000 gal 
Unit Cost $ kgal 
R - electric rate, $/kwhr 
h - pump head, ft 
- 0.00314 R ~ 
e 
e = average wire-to-water pump efficiency 
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Table 14 
Capital Cost Estimates for Proposed Alternatives 
Alternative 
Supply alternative 
15th and Eads Interconnection 
Roosevelt Bridge River Crossing 
14th Street Bridge River Crossing 
Booster Pump Off Low Service 
Subaqueous River Crossing 
New Tank at Navy Annex 
Main-strengthening alternative 
Paralleling 30-in. main 
New airport feed 
Closing Pentagon loop 
Constructing new Pentagon loop 
Capital Cost 
(Thousands of Dollars) 
0 
9,750 
10,990 
8,638 
8,948 
2,033 
1,441 
2,341 
239 
54 
256. Based on a previous study conducted by the US Army Corps of Engi-
neers on the condition of the DC pumps (Ormsbee et al. 1987), the average 
efficiency of the First High and Third High pumping units was found to be 
80 percent. The study also identified the seasonal and hourly electrical rate 
structure charged to the WAD. An average electrical cost of $0.0438/kwhr was 
found based on an analysis of the distribution of the rate schedule. Pumping 
heads were found by conducting a steady-state analysis on the First High and 
Third High systems assuming an average daily demand loading. The pump head 
for First High was found to be 140 ft while the Third High pump head was 
330 ft. 
257. Unit costs of energy costs were computed using Equation 2. The 
unit cost of pumping for DC First High, including the FOWM system, is 
$0.024/1,000 gal. For the Third High pressure zone which also includes 
Arlington County, a unit pumping cost of $0.057/1,000 gal was found. As can 
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be seen from these values, water supplied through the existing and proposed 
interconnections is approximately 2.5 times as expensive as water supplied 
through the existing and alternative river crossings. 
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PART X: RECOMMENDATIONS 
258. Based on the hydraulic, engineering, and economic analyses, cer-
tain recommendations are made which will result in a more reliable FOW}i water 
distribution system. The recommendations were made with an emphasis on possi-
ble long-term pipe outages. In other words, if a critical FOWM link, such as 
the Key Bridge river crossing or the 30- in. FOWM transmission main were placed 
out of service for an extended period of time, which recommended alternatives 
proposed could adequately supply the FOWM system under all loading conditions 
with no adverse effects? Such alternatives should allow the FOWM system to 
"stand alone" without having to rely on another distribution system. 
259. Constructing a new river crossing from Foxhall Reservoir across 
the Potomac River to FOWM would essentially replicate the existing Key Bridge 
crossing, thereby greatly increasing FOWM reliability. The river crossing 
should be ab l e to supply the FOWM system if a segment of the 30-in. transmis-
sion main in FOWM were to fail. The 14th Street Bridge River Crossing alter-
native can independently supply the FOWM network under such conditions. In 
fact, the 14th Street Bridge river crossing can adequately supply the FOWM 
system for outages of all critical FOWM lines during most loading conditions. 
The only case where the 14th Street Bridge crossing is unable to provide ade-
quate flow to FOW}i is during a Pentagon fire with the Key Bridge river cross-
ing out of service. 
260. With the Key Bridge river crossing out of service, a fire demand 
at the Pentagon cannot be satisfied by the 14th Street Bridge crossing because 
of high head losses in the existing 24- and 16-in. lines between the Pentagon 
and National Airport. If the New Airport Feed alternative were constructed 
along with the 14th Street Bridge river crossing, the head loss would be sig-
nificantly reduced, plus water would be allowed to reach the fire from a dif-
ferent direction. As a result, a Pentagon fire demand could be met with the 
Key Bridge crossing out of service. Furthermore, installing the new airport 
feed results in a second supply source for National Airport. This also 
greatly increases the reliability of the FOWM system. With the 14th Street 
Bridge crossing and new airport feed in service, the fire flow to the airport 
is nearly 20,000 gpm during maximum daily demands. This easily exceeds ISO 
fire-fighting requirements. 
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261. With the combined 14th Street Bridge crossing and new airport feed 
alternative, the FOWM system can be supplied with adequate flows and pressures 
during FOWM pipe outage under any loading condition. Table 15 lists the pres-
sure indices and number of failed nodes for the combined alternative during 
average daily demands, maximum daily demands, peak houfly demands, a 7,500-gpm 
fire demand at the Pentagon, a 7,500-gpm fire demand at National Airport, and 
a 2,400-gpm fire demand at Fort Myer. 
262. The loop around the Pentagon and the National Airport interconnec-
tion from Arlington County should be repaired. Although these alternatives 
provide a marginal increase in hydraulic performance, reliability is increased 
by adding these lines as additional loops are created. Closing the Pentagon 
loop is part of the New Airport Feed alternative, and ins talling a new airport 
feed eliminates the need for an airport interconnection. Therefore, con-
structing the new airport feed will have the same effect as repairing the 
crushed Pentagon loop and airport interconnection. In fact, performance will 
be improved since the fire flow to National Airport is increased with the new 
airport feed. 
263. A potential benefit identified during the course of the study is 
supplying Arlington County Third Gravity directly from DC First High. The 
elevations and hydraulic grades in FOWM and Arlington County Third Gravity are 
approximately the same. Currently, however, water is passed through PRV's in 
the Arlington County system before it reaches Third High in order to bring the 
pressure down to acceptable values. Since the operating grades in FOWM and 
Third Gravity are the same, and water supplied from DC First High is less 
expensive in terms of energy use than water from DC Third High, significant 
savings could be realized by supplying Third Gravity through FOWM. 
264. From a previous energy analysis for the 15th and Eads interconnec-
tion, it was found that water supplied by DC Third High has a unit cost 2.5 
times greater than water supplied by DC First High. Assuming an average daily 
demand of 3,900 gpm for Arlington County Third Gravity, an annual savings of 
approximately $70,000 may be realized by supplying Arlington County Third 
Gravity from DC Firs t High through the FOWM system. Even more savings may be 
realized with increased Crystal City growth and water demand. The implementa-
tion of such an operation policy would be dependent upon the hydraulic capac-
ity of the Dalecarlia First High Pump Station, the hydraulic characteristics 
of FOWM, and the coordination of the various utilities. The existing FOWM 
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Table 15 
Pressure Indices for Combined 14th Street Bridge River Crossing and New Airport Feed Alternative* 
ADD MDD PHD Fl F2 F3 
Pipe Outage PI FN PI FN PI FN PI FN PI FN PI 
30 • 1n. under Key Bridge 45.77 4 43 .67 4 35.36 4 42.42 4 42.34 4 61.12 
16 • under Key Bridge 46.28 4 44.82 4 38.19 4 59 .18 0 56 . 38 0 64.56 1n. 
30 • along Davis Hwy. Jll 46.22 4 44 .50 4 37 .83 4 49.64 0 48.47 0 65.08 1n. 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. 112 46.23 4 44.52 4 37.90 4 49.41 0 48.33 0 65.16 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. 46.1 2 4 44.31 4 37.26 4 59.14 0 56 .29 0 65.07 
Ill 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. 46.08 4 44.24 4 37 .05 4 59.05 0 56.17 0 65.01 
12 
18 
24 
16 
30 
* 
J/2 
in. by Navy Annex 46.26 4 44 .57 4 38.05 4 60.32 0 57.35 0 64.94 
• 1n. by Pentagon 46.34 4 44.72 4 38 .49 4 60.43 0 56.96 0 65.10 
• 1n. to Airport 46.33 4 44 .71 4 38.45 4 60.01 0 57.17 0 65.09 
• 1n. to Airport 46.31 4 44.67 4 38.35 4 59.72 0 57.44 0 65.05 
in. and 16 in. under Key 44.67 4 41.62 4 29.26 4 16.37 6 23 .10 5 54.34 
Bridge 
ADD = average daily demand, MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, Fl = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 = National Airport fire demand, F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, PI = pressure index, and FN 
= number of failed nodes. 
FN 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
system may not be able to handle the added strain associated with the increase 
in demand from Arlington County Third High. However, constructing the 14th 
Street Bridge river crossing would most likely avert any problems of this 
nature. Furthermore, supplying Arlington Third Gravity from the 14th Street 
Bridge not only results in energy savings but also increases the reliability 
of the Third High pressure zone since an additional source of supply is 
provided. 
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PART XI: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Existing System Summary 
265. The reliability of the existing FOWM system is highly dependent 
upon three different pipe links. The first and most important segment is the 
Key Bridge river crossing which carries the entire FOWM supply. If the two 
mains which make up this crossing are taken out of service, an alternate means 
of supply must be employed. At the present time, the only alternate means of 
supply are several interconnections with the Arlington County, Virginia, dis-
tribution system. 
266. A second vital link in the FOWM system is the 30-in. steel main 
extending from Key Bridge to the Pentagon. This line carries close to 83 per-
cent of the total delivery to the FOWM system. If this line were to be placed 
out of service, all flow would have to be routed through the 16-in. line along 
Eisenhower Drive. During periods of high consumption or fire demand, flow in 
the 16-in. line would cause excessive head loss. As a result, system pres-
sures would be reduced below acceptable levels, and system demands could not 
be fully met. 
267. A final area of concern is the feed to National Airport. This 
link consists of a 24-in. pipe and a 16-in. pipe connected in series. This is 
the only source of supply for National Airport. If this line were out of 
service, an alternate means of supply would have to be provided in order for 
the airport to continue its normal operations. Furthermore, the available 
fire flow to the airport through this line is 3,500 gpm during maximum daily 
demands. Consequently, ISO fire fighting requirements of 7,500 gpm cannot be 
met by this line. 
System Improvements Summary 
268. Several system improvements were evaluated to determine their con-
tribution to the overall reliability of the FOWM system. System improvements 
may be categorized as supply alternatives or main-strengthening alternatives. 
Supply alternatives consist of both existing and proposed interconnections, 
proposed river crossings, and a proposed storage tank. Main-strengthening 
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alternatives include paralleling existing lines, repairing damaged lines, and 
laying new pipe. 
Existing interconnections 
269. The 15th and Eads, Fern Street, and Crystal City interconnections 
can supply the FOWM system during normal flow periods in the event of supply 
disruption through the existing Key Bridge river crossing. As system demands 
increase, however, the performance of e,xisting interconnections deteriorates 
to such a point that FOWM system pressures cannot be kept above the 40-psi 
standard for extended periods of time. 
270. Performance of the Arlington Third Gravity storage tank is 
adversely affected with operation of the 15th and Eads, Fern Street, and 
Crystal City interconnections. Opening these connections to supply FOWM will 
cause the tank to ultimately drain c'Ompletely. This is unacceptable since no 
emergency storage or fire storage is available in the tank. In fact, it is 
unlikely Arlington County will allow continued supply of the FOWM system if 
the Third Gravity tank drains to a dangerously low level. 
271. The Navy Annex and Pentagon heating plant interconnections cannot 
adequately supply the FOWM system. These connections may, however, be used to 
supply the adjacent Federal areas. The Fort Myer interconnection is very sim-
ilar to the Navy Annex interconnection and, as a result, should be used to 
help supply Fort Myer in the event of an emergency. 
Proposed interconnections 
272. The proposed Rosslyn interconnections cannot adequately supply the 
FOWM system particularly during a period of high flow because of large head 
losses induced in the Rosslyn pressure zone. The Rosslyn pressure zone, 
unlike Second and Third Gravity, does not have a storage tank to help augment 
supply during peak loadings. The National Airport interconnection is to be 
used as an alternate feed to the airport only. Although it can supply the 
airport during most loading conditions, the interconnection cannot, by itself, 
supply the necessary 7,500-gpm fire flow. 
New river crossings 
273. The proposed river crossing alternatives may also be used to 
supply the FOWM network in the event of an outage of the Key Bridge river 
crossing. It is assumed that these new supply lines will be operated at all 
times and not just in times of emergency. Coupled with certain main-
strengthening alternatives, the proposed new river crossings can supply FOWM 
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at adequate pressures during each of the outage scenarios analyzed as part of 
this study. 
274. The proposed river crossing alternatives have no adverse effect on 
the controlling Foxhall tank. Because of the large capacity of Foxhall tank 
and the rated capacity of the Dalecarlia First High pumps, Foxhall tank can be 
filled as necessary to provide ample storage. The proposed river crossing 
alternatives merely act to replace the existing river crossing and as a result 
drain the tank no differently than the existing crossing. 
New tank at Navy Annex 
275. A proposed storage tank at the Navy Annex may also be used to 
supply the FOWM system during a Key Bridge outage, but only for a limited 
period of time. With the existing Key Bridge river crossing in service, the 
proposed tank is able to fill and drain thereby providing proper turnover of 
water. If both pipes comprising the existing river crossing were taken off-
line and the existing interconnections not opened, the proposed tank would 
drain in a matter of hours depending upon the initial tank level. A more 
practical use for the storage tank would be to help augment supply during 
short duration peak loading conditions or during periods of fire demand. 
Main-Strengthening Alternatives 
Paralleling 30-in. main 
276. In addition to the Key Bridge river crossing, outage of certain 
other critical lines will also cause below par performance of the existing 
system, specifically, outage of the 30-in. line from Key Bridge to the Penta-
gon and the compound 24- and 16-in. airport feed. Installing connections 
between the existing 30- and 16-in. supply lines and paralleling the existing 
30-in. line with a 16-in. main would help to relieve stress on the 16-in. line 
during a 30-in. main outage. This main-strengthening alternative acts to keep 
as much of the 30-in. line as possible in service at all times. Employing 
this strategy would enable system pressures to remain above the 40-psi limit 
during outage of a segment of the existing 30-in. line. However, this alter-
native does not provide adequate pressures during an outage of the 30- and 
16-in. supply lines under Key Bridge during period of high flow. 
New airport feed 
277. Another main-strengthening alternative is construction of the 
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proposed new airport feed. Presently the available fire flow to National Air-
port through this line is approximately 3,500 gpm. As a result, ISO fire-
fighting requirements of 7,500 gpm cannot be met. Installation of the new 
airport feed would allow ISO requirements at the airport to be met and would 
provide another source of flow to the airport. 
Closing Pentagon loop and 
constructing new Pentagon loop 
278. Other reliability-improving measures involving new pipeline con-
struction are closing the Pentagon loop and creating a new Pentagon loop. 
Although the improvement in system performance with these alternatives is mar-
ginal, reliability is increased since adding these lines creates additional 
loops. 
Recommendations 
279. The reliability of the FOWM sys tem can be greatly increased by 
constructing a new river crossing extending from the Foxhall Reservoir across 
the 14th Street Bridge and connecting to the FOWM system in Crystal City. 
Along with the 14th Street Bridge crossing, the new airport feed from the 
Pentagon along Jefferson Davis Highway to Washington National Airport should 
also be constructed to provide even more reliability. The two alternatives, 
working in tandem, provide a hydraulically equivalent backup to the Key Bridge 
river crossing, the 30-in. FOWM transmission main, and the existing airport 
feed. This combined alternative provides adequate flows and pressures during 
outages of critical FOWM lines during any loading condition. Furthermore, if 
this combined alternative is connected t o the Arlington County Third Gravity 
pressure zone, significant energy savings plus an increase in Arlington County 
reliability could be realized. 
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APPENDIX A: HYDRAULIC NETWORK DATA 
Table Al 
Pipe Data for First High Pressure Zone 
Length Diameter Hazen-Williams 
Connecting Nodes ft in. C-Factor 
600 601 11,900 48 90 
601 0 1,200 48 90 
601 602 7,320 30 90 
601 603 7,420 48 90 
603 602 2 30 90 
603 605 10 30 90 
602 604 10 48 90 
Table A2 
Pipe Data for Third High Pressure Zone 
Length Diameter Hazen-Williams 
Connecting Nodes ft in. C-Factor 
500 101 4,150 24 91 
500 101 4,530 36 117 
500 7 12,480 48 150 
500 4 7,200 36 100 
7 0 500 36 150 
A3 
Table A3 
Pipe Data for Arlington System 
Length Diameter Hazen-Williams 
Connec ting Nodes ft in. C-Factor 
101 102 700 20 91 
101 102 700 20 91 
101 102 700 20 91 
101 102 700 48 117 
102 103 1,800 36 117 
103 104 1,460 36 117 
103 112 4,900 36 117 
104 105 1,000 8 108 
105 107 1,225 8 108 
105 106 1,450 8 108 
106 107 1,730 8 108 
107 109 1,230 8 108 
109 111 1,060 8 108 
104 108 3,680 20 91 
112 111 650 8 108 
112 115 1,920 36 117 
115 114 280 30 117 
108 110 1,535 20 91 
111 110 760 8 108 
109 108 375 8 108 
111 114 2,265 8 108 
110 114 800 20 91 
110 162 2,450 8 108 
162 113 1,150 8 108 
113 164 1,135 30 117 
. 114 113 2,680 30 117 
113 116 3,970 6 108 
114 116 2,050 20 91 
116 117 1,760 20 91 
115 118 3,475 36 117 
118 119 2,455 36 117 
117 119 1,825 16 105 
117 120 2,000 20 91 
120 121 1,360 12 117 
119 121 2,300 36 117 
119 126 5,810 16 105 
121 125 1,860 12 117 
125 126 2,855 12 117 
126 159 625 12 117 
121 124 2,670 36 117 
124 134 3,850 20 91 
134 135 . 550 20 91 
126 135 900 16 105 
(Continued) 
(Sheet 1 of 7) 
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Table A3 (Continued) 
Length Diameter Hazen-Williams 
Connecting Nodes ft • 1n. C-Factor 
135 157 1,150 16 105 
134 136 730 12 117 
136 156 1,600 16 105 
136 135 450 16 105 
136 137 650 16 105 
124 129 1,650 36 117 
120 122 2,170 12 117 
122 123 1,000 16 105 
123 127 850 12 117 
127 129 2,285 12 117 
129 133 915 12 117 
133 137 2,855 8 108 
137 138 1,085 8 108 
138 163 460 12 117 
163 173 1,500 6 108 
159 174 3,245 12 117 
157 175 1,850 16 105 
156 176 675 16 105 
137 139 515 16 105 
139 141 450 16 105 
139 140 935 12 117 
140 138 500 12 117 
140 142 750 6 108 
142 141 1,035 12 117 
141 150 1,840 16 105 
129 131 460 36 117 
131 132 350 36 117 
131 133 950 16 105 
132 158 915 8 108 
158 160 475 12 117 
160 149 1,675 12 117 
133 160 500 16 105 
160 149 1,565 16 105 
149 148 710 12 117 
149 150 1,225 16 105 
148 147 400 12 117 
148 152 600 8 108 
152 161 900 8 108 
150 161 850 16 105 
172 152 1,200 12 117 
161 151 1,330 16 105 
155 170 650 16 105 
155 177 550 16 105 
147 146 1,300 12 117 
(Continued) 
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Table A3 (Continued) 
Length Diameter Hazen-Williams 
Connecting Nodes ft in. C-Factor 
146 154 425 12 117 
132 144 2,500 36 117 
144 147 1,735 8 108 
144 145 1,425 30 117 
145 146 1,235 8 108 
145 153 1,100 30 117 
131 128 2,530 16 105 
132 130 2,600 8 108 
144 143 1,160 8 108 
143 130 3,235 6 108 
128 127 1,330 8 108 
130 128 1,300 8 108 
154 178 1,900 12 117 
153 179 1,260 30 117 
102 104 2,715 24 91 
104 501 550 24 91 
170 151 230 16 105 
151 171 300 12 117 
171 172 300 12 117 
149 165 230 12 117 
243 244 2,570 8 117 
244 237 4,300 12 96 
237 236 2,240 12 96 
261 235 1,530 12 96 
235 270 760 12 116 
239 243 3 ,090 12 116 
239 238 900 12 116 
238 237 875 12 116 
242 243 1,040 8 116 
242 224 3,185 30 71 
223 224 1,050 12 116 
224 239 480 12 116 
224 225 660 24 71 
225 226 2,920 20 71 
248 242 1,850 8 116 
223 240 2,200 8 116 
240 248 1,200 8 116 
238 226 2,165 12 116 
226 227 1,610 20 71 
227 228 2,380 20 71 
227 228 2,200 12 116 
228 229 1,700 20 71 
229 235 1,730 8 116 
229 273 1,300 20 71 
(Continued) 
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Table A3 (Continued) 
Length Diameter Hazen-Williams 
Connecting Nodes ft • 1n. C-Factor 
229 231 3,075 8 116 
229 230 3,690 6 116 
230 231 1,525 6 116 
231 232 1,100 8 116 
232 233 1,500 8 116 
233 234 1,650 8 116 
241 240 4,430 6 116 
222 223 1,150 6 116 
222 241 1,360 6 116 
241 202 1,900 8 116 
202 780 2,650 12 116 
202 201 1,635 8 116 
219 226 2,980 12 116 
219 225 1,825 20 116 
219 223 2,350 8 116 
221 222 3,820 6 116 
219 221 2,480 8 116 
203 221 2,080 8 116 
202 203 2,165 12 116 
203 217 2,930 20 71 
221 218 2,050 6 116 
219 220 2,270 8 116 
220 246 2,300 8 116 
219 247 2,290 12 71 
219 247 2,370 16 71 
218 247 860 12 116 
217 247 1,915 16 116 
218 246 775 6 116 
217 218 920 12 116 
216 215 3,880. 16 116 
201 204 1,500 20 116 
204 203 1,530 20 116 
207 206 825 6 116 
204 207 2,060 8 116 
205 204 2,230 12 116 
205 206 1,440 12 116 
208 216 2,075 12 116 
206 208 2,565 12 116 
208 209 5, 130 8 116 
209 215 2,200 8 116 
209 210 1,000 12 116 
212 214 2,290 8 116 
213 214 1,360 16 116 
214 215 500 16 116 
213 212 350 16 116 
(Continued) 
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Table A3 (Continued) 
Length Diameter Hazen-Williams 
Connecting Nodes ft • C-Factor 1.n. 
210 213 1,655 8 116 
210 211 3,145 8 116 
211 212 1,985 8 116 
215 271 2,180 6 116 
216 217 775 16 116 
217 272 500 12 116 
236 260 1,100 12 116 
260 261 630 12 116 
303 302 565 8 • 113 
301 302 2,600 12 113 
302 305 2,775 12 113 
305 304 1,400 12 113 
304 316 5,500 24 101 
305 306 1,650 12 113 
306 307 1,375 12 113 
307 310 4,345 12 113 
305 308 4,020 8 113 
308 309 1,865 8 113 
309 310 950 8 113 
332 333 1,855 12 113 
333 334 1,200 12 110 
329 334 2,100 12 113 
334 335 550 12 110 
335 336 760 12 110 
335 337 2,000 12 113 
336 337 1,500 24 101 
338 331 875 20 77 
301 339 1,830 16 113 
304 339 4,540 24 101 
331 332 950 12 113 
331 330 500 20 77 
330 329 840 12 77 
329 332 1,520 12 113 
330 317 550 16 77 
317 318 525 16 77 
318 329 800 8 113 
318 319 550 16 77 
329 328 1,400 12 77 
328 327 800 12 113 
327 325 1,050 12 113 
327 326 460 12 113 
326 337 1,010 12 113 
326 325 980 12 113 
325 324 975 12 113 
320 336 2,790 24 101 
(Continued) 
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Table A3 (Continued) 
Length Diameter Hazen-Williams 
Connecting Nodes ft in. C-Factor 
325 321 1,475 12 113 
325 321 1,475 12 113 
325 321 1,475 12 113 
324 323 1,550 12 113 
323 321 825 12 113 
321 311 1,000 12 113 
323 322 1,115 12 113 
322 311 850 12 113 
321 311 720 12 113 
321 311 1,020 12 113 
319 316 2,420 24 101 
316 314 1,650 8 113 
314 319 865 16 113 
313 314 1,000 16 113 
314 315 1,200 8 113 
319 320 1,125 24 101 
312 313 1,200 16 113 
320 315 865 16 113 
315 312 1,000 16 113 
315 321 830 8 113 
312 311 1,040 16 113 
325 326 980 12 113 
310 311 3,840 12 113 
328 340 475 12 110 
340 341 475 12 113 
341 342 230 113 
342 343 150 8 113 
342 336 80 12 113 
415 411 1,015 12 100 
415 414 2,200 12 100 
414 413 1,360 12 100 
411 412 1,260 16 100 
412 413 500 16 100 
404 405 2,535 12 100 
405 412 615 12 100 
405 406 470 12 100 
406 413 600 12 100 
403 404 665 12 100 
402 403 570 12 100 
401 402 1,150 6 100 
402 410 1,665 12 100 
410 408 2,075 8 100 
410 409 950 12 100 
409 408 1,400 6 100 
403 407 2,800 12 100 
(Continued) 
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Table A3 (Concluded) 
Length Diameter Hazen- Williams 
Connecting Nodes ft • C-Factor ~n. 
408 407 630 8 100 
407 406 500 12 100 
159 411 3,245 12 100 
157 411 1,850 16 100 
156 404 675 16 100 
163 401 1,500 6 100 
155 244 550 16 117 
154 243 1,900 12 117 
153 242 1,260 30 117 
235 333 760 12 116 
229 338 1,300 20 71 
217 301 500 12 116 
215 303 2,180 6 116 
247 0 100 12 88 
339 0 100 16 107 
636 327 1 24 100 
638 324 1 16 120 
651 326 1 16 120 
632 351 1 8 120 
351 350 1,330 8 111 
350 337 1,000 12 111 
634 335 1 24 120 
633 670 1 8 120 
• 
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Table A4 
Pipe Data for FOWM System 
Length Diameter Hazen-Williams 
Connecting Nodes ft in. C-Factor 
602 606 1,580 30 93 
602 607 1,820 16 103 
606 608 2,590 30 93 
607 609 2,360 16 96 
608 610 3,340 30 93 
609 611 3,450 16 96 
610 612 340 30 93 
610 613 530 16 93 
611 613 63 16 96 
612 614 1,890 30 93 
611 615 1,900 16 96 
614 615 1,590 8 60 
614 616 1,960 30 93 
615 617 1,390 16 96 
616 618 1,210 8 60 
618 620 1,600 8 60 
620 674 990 16 84 
674 622 240 16 84 
674 675 65 10 60 
675 676 375 8 60 
616 622 1,830 30 93 
617 619 1,260 16 96 
619 621 880 16 96 
621 623 670 16 96 
623 625 240 16 96 
625 627 420 10 90 
627 629 66 8 70 
629 631 720 8 70 
631 633 1,400 8 70 
629 635 1,460 8 70 
635 637 1,150 8 70 
625 624 1,610 12 66 
664 626 285 24 65 
626 624 700 18 86 
620 628 1,120 16 84 
626 628 1,940 16 84 
628 630 1,120 8 60 
630 677 325 6 60 
677 632 845 6 60 
624 634 1,860 24 60 
634 636 2,800 24 60 
636 651 1,070 16 90 
638 640 1,540 16 90 
640 642 1,250 8 60 
640 644 1,650 16 90 
(Continued) 
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Table A4 (Concluded) 
Length Diameter Hazen-Williams 
Connecting Nodes ft in. C-Factor 
644 646 570 16 90 
646 648 1,330 8 60 
644 650 1,100 8 60 
622 660 265 24 65 
660 661 300 8 111 
660 662 360 24 65 
662 663 440 24 65 
663 664 350 24 65 
260 670 180 8 96 
670 671 900 8 116 
671 672 230 8 116 
672 673 300 8 116 
651 638 660 16 90 
A12 
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Table A5 
Junction Data for First High Pressure Zone 
Node 
604 
605 
Table A7 
Demand 
gpm 
6,163 
6,163 
Junction Data for Arlington System 
Demand 
Node gpm 
114 530 
131 998 
135 1,004 
164 950 
217 768 
219 1,420 
234 813 
237 403 
304 1,102 
313 1,444 
325 753 
330 605 
403 559 
406 559 
409 559 
411 559 
501 3,145 
Table A6 
Junction Data for Third High Pressure Zone 
Node 
4 
7 
Node 
613 
615 
617 
Table A8 
Junction Data for FOWM System 
626, 
628 
630 
631 
633 
637 
642 
644 
646 
648 
650 
Demand 
gpm 
7,100 
7,100 
Demand 
gpm 
249 
62 
62 
479 
249 
124 
124 
124 
124 
124 
124 
124 
124 
124 
APPENDIX B: PRESSURE INDICES 
1. A steady-state hydraulic analysis was conducted for each supply and 
main-strengthening alternative for a given pipe outage under a particular 
loading condition to determine its contribution to Federally Owned Water 
Main (FOWM) system reliability and hydraulic performance. For a given alter-
native and for each pipe scenario (pipe outage under a particular loading con-
dition), a pressure index or severity index was computed (Tables Bl-BlS). 
2. The severity index used in this study is a pressure index based on 
pressure differences from an absolute minimum and is defined below: 
where 
N 
L (P. - p i ) ~ m n 
PI - pressure index 
i=l PI -
N - total number of nodes 
P. -pressure at junction node i 
~ 
P . - minimum allowable pressure 
m~n 
N 
3. The advantage of using a severity index is that it enables quick 
(Bl) 
identification of those key mains which, when placed out of service, will 
adversely affect the performance of the system. The minimum allowable pres-
sure was set at 40 psi for all scenarios except those which involved fire 
demands. For fire demand situations, the minimum allowable pressure was set 
at 20 psi. 
B3 
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Table Bl 
Pressure Indices for 15th and Eads Interconnection* 
Pipe Scenario ADD MDD PHD Fl F2 F3 F4 
30 in. under Key Bridge 30.02 27.45 13.02 24.74 18.90 45.74 40.65 
16 in. under Key Bridge 38.41 35.99 27.49 50.61 36.52 55.65 55.60 
30 • l.n. along Davis Hwy. ill 34.74 32.42 21.22 35.99 27.29 53.55 47.96 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. t/2 35.23 32.99 21.44 35.54 27.08 54.10 47.79 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. Ill 37.98 35.53 26.62 50.58 35.69 56.41 54.90 
16 • along Eisenhower Dr. 112 37.88 35.36 26.26 50.60 35.52 56.30 54.75 l.n. 
12 • l.n. by Navy Annex 39.44 37.16 28.88 23.00 38.00 57.47 56.93 
18 • by Pentagon 39.53 37.31 28.71 50.90 36.50 57.88 55.85 l.n. 
24 in. to airport 41.25 39.19 30.30 51.56 38.50 59.71 57.80 
16 in. to airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
30 in. and 16" under Key 24.16 19.07 -12.71 -22.56 0.03 30.25 25.96 
Bridge 
24 • l.D.. from Dalecarlia 39.10 36.81 28.56 52.18 37.61 57.16 56.55 
36 in. from Dalecarlia 39.10 36.81 23.86 52.18 37.61 57.16 56.55 
PRV at Army-Navy Dr. 39.10 36.81 28.61 52.18 37.61 57.16 56.55 
PRV at s 16th and Lynn St. 39.10 36.81 28.61 52.18 37.61 57.16 56.55 
Gravity Three tank riser 38.82 36.11 26.82 51.94 37.04 56.71 55.97 
* ADD = average daily demand, MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, F1 = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 = National Airport fire demand, F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, F4 = Crystal City fire demand. 
to 
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Table B2 
Pressure Indices for Fern Street Interconnection* 
Pipe Scenario ADD MDD PHD Fl F2 F3 
30 in. under Key Bridge 30.10 27 .96 14.78 31.66 16.39 46.93 
16 • 1n. under Key Bridge 37.78 35.31 27.54 51.02 31.31 54.91 
30 • l.n. along Davis Hwy. Ill 34 . 79 32.69 22.24 40.58 24.25 53.64 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. 112 35.34 33.33 22.53 41.02 24.62 54.24 
16 • l.n. along Eisenhower Dr. /1 1 37.27 34.95 26 .73 51.03 30.49 55.64 
16 • 10. along Eisenhower Dr • 112 37.19 34.83 26.40 51.10 30.43 55.57 
12 in. by Navy Annex 39.01 36.70 28.92 53.33 33.14 56.97 
18 • 1n. by Pentagon 39.52 37.35 28.97 50.94 32.28 57.88 
24 • to airport 41.30 39.29 30.53 51.62 34.66 59.77 1n. 
16 in. to airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
30 • 10. and 16" under Key Bridge 25.91 22.36 -5.09 2.17 0.49 36.80 
24 • 1n. from Dalecarlia 38.60 36.14 28.54 52.43 32.47 56.57 
36 in. from Dalecarlia 38.60 36.14 23.23 52.43 32.47 56.57 
PRV at Army- Navy Dr. 38.60 36.14 28.62 52.43 32.47 56.57 
PRV at s 16th and Lynn St. 38.60 36. 14 28.62 52.43 32.47 56.57 
Gravity Three tank riser 37.99 35.74 26.85 52.19 31.94 56.02 
* ADD = average daily demand , MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, Fl = Pentagon 
f ire demand, F2 = National Airport fire demand, F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, F4 = Crystal City fire 
demand. 
F4 
44.56 
56.01 
50.83 
51.58 
55.41 
55.34 
57.51 
57.41 
59.40 
N/A 
34.93 
56.93 
56.93 
56.93 
56.93 
56.54 
t:xl 
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Table B3 
Pressure Indices for Airport Interconnections* 
Pipe Scenario ADD MDD PHD F1 F2 F3 F4 
30 in. under Key Bridge 30 . 27 27 . 26 10. 89 10.45 19.81 43.83 38 .73 
16 in. under Key Bridge 39 . 87 37.29 28 . 31 50 .18 44 . 69 56 .90 56.06 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. ill 34 . 96 32.44 20.39 25 . 33 29 . 83 53 . 68 46.44 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. 112 35.31 32.87 20 . 32 22 .98 29.09 54.13 46 .30 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. 1/ 1 39.45 26 . 78 27 . 34 50 .07 43.79 57.70 55 .39 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. 112 39 . 31 26 .57 26 .96 50 . 04 43.52 57 .54 55 .19 
12 in. by Navy Annex 40.59 38 .19 29 . 60 52 .66 45 .90 58.52 57.11 
18 in. by Pentagon 39 . 78 37.55 29 . 00 51.01 41.69 58 .08 55 .05 
24 in.to airport 41.26 39 . 21 30.38 51.58 42.18 59.73 56.34 
16 in. to airport 42 .25 40.16 31.36 51 .48 45.41 60 .60 58.42 
30 in. and 16" under Key Bridge 20.47 12.18 -32.76 -95.07 -21.01 13.31 13.65 
24 in. from Dalecarlia 40.44 38.01 29 .38 52 .00 45.75 58 .38 56 .91 
36 in. from Dalecarlia 40.44 38.01 25 . 31 52.00 45.75 58.38 56.91 
PRV at Army-Navy Dr. 40.44 38 .01 29 .43 52.00 45.75 58.38 56.91 
PRV at s 16th and Lynn St. 40.44 38.01 29.43 52 .00 45.75 58.38 56.91 
Gravity Three tank riser 40.01 37.46 27.68 51.80 45.29 57.83 56.34 
* ADD = average daily demand, MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, Fl = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 = National Airport fire demand, F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, F4 = Crystal City fire demand. 
t::d 
........ 
Table B4 
Pressure Indices for Heating Plant Interconnection* 
Pipe Scenario ADD MDD PHD F1 F2 F3 F4 
30 in. under Key Bridge 30.38 18.65 -33.74 -130.73 -159.45 16.53 47.69 
16 • 1n. under Key Bridge 43.84 40.79 29.02 46.15 16.50 60.49 63.49 
30 • along Davis Hwy • Ill 35.38 27.75 -7.34 -106 .67 -132.51 52.96 53.33 1n. 
30 • 1n. along Davis Hwy. /12 33.56 23.54 -19.78 -169.56 -193.89 51.05 51.34 
16 • 1n. along Eisenhower Dr • Ill 43.55 40.26 27.54 45.66 12.06 61.49 53.20 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. 112 43.42 40.03 26.93 45.24 10.63 61.33 53.07 
12 • 1n. by Navy Annex 44.15 41.34 30.42 49.27 18.51 61.88 53.82 
18 in. by Pentagon 42.42 38.05 20.37 51.4 7 -126.55 59.75 52.11 
24 • to airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1n. 
16 • l.n. to airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
30 in. and 16 in. under Key 
Bridge -857.85 -1,625.66 -4,898.08 -13780 -13808 -3425.79 -849.98 
24 • 1n. from Dalecarlia 44.15 41.33 30.39 49.63 20.08 61.88 63.82 
36 in. from Dalecarlia 44.15 41.33 29.40 49.63 20.08 61.88 63.79 
PRV at Army-Navy Dr. 44.15 41.33 30.39 49.63 20.08 61.88 63.82 
PRV at s 16th and Lynn St . 44.15 41.33 30.39 49.63 20.08 61.88 63.82 
Gravity Three tank riser 44.07 41.29 29.88 49.49 19.97 61.80 63.70 
* ADD = average daily demand, MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, Fl = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 = National Airport fire demand, F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, F4 = Crystal City fire demand. 
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Table B5 
Pressure I ndices for Navy Annex Interconnection* 
Pipe Scenario ADD MDD PHD F1 F2 F3 F4 
30 • 1n. under Key Bridge 39.94 28 .93 -1 7.52 - 98 . 57 -126 . 77 31 . 22 56 . 13 
16 in. under Key Bridge 45 . 62 42.83 30.72 48 . 81 19.45 62 . 91 65 . 01 
30 • along Davis Hwy. Ill 40. 01 30.92 - 8 . 30 -129 . 67 - 154.61 57.24 57 . 92 1n. 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. 112 36 .87 24 .67 -27.30 - 226 .02 - 248.56 24 . 30 54.46 
16 in. along Davis Hwy 45.76 42.82 30 . 25 49 . 53 17.85 64.01 64 . 93 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. 45.86 42.84 30.21 49.20 16.50 64.12 64.92 
12 in. by Navy Annex 45.67 42 . 96 31.70 50.37 19.19 63 .18 65.18 
18 in. by Pentagon 45.09 41.50 25 . 34 54.20 -98.83 62 .93 64 .05 
24 in. t o airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
16 in. t o airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
30 in. and 16 in. under 
Key Bridge -1 73 . 39 - 390 . 55 -1, 255 . 39 - 3 ,857 .41 -3,883 .15 - 887 . 25 -1 74.65 
24 in. from Dalecarlia 45.72 43.09 31.81 51.82 22 .51 63 .82 65 .19 
36 in. from Dalecarlia 45.51 42.64 30.27 51.24 21.88 63 .47 64.80 
PRV at Army-Navy Dr. 45.72 43.12 31.90 51.82 22 . 51 63 . 82 65.22 
PRV at s 16th and Lynn St. 45.72 43.12 31.90 51.82 22.51 63.82 65.22 
Gravity Three tank riser 45.63 43 . 01 31.44 51.53 22.18 53.65 65 .08 
* ADD = average daily demand, MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, F1 = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 = National Airport fire demand, F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, F4 = Crystal City fire demand. 
Oj 
\0 
Table B6 
Pressure Indices for Rosslyn Interconnections* 
Pipe Scenario ADD MDD PHD Fl F2 F3 F4 
30 • under Key Bridge 48.06 45.91 0.07 46.28 16.57 65.76 68.06 ~n. 
16 • ~n. under Key Bridge 46.50 44.09 27.42 52.96 23.16 64.96 66.50 
30 • ~n. along Davis Hwy. Il l 37.57 27.44 -22.43 -156.33 -181.36 55.79 57.58 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. 112 33.34 19.80 -44.65 -265.05 -287.57 51.82 53.45 
16 • along Eisenhower Dr • ltl 45.84 43.05 26.00 49.87 15.86 64.73 65.84 ~n. 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. #2 45.72 42.86 25.34 49.48 14.34 64.60 65.74 
12 • ~n. by Navy Annex 46.45 44.19 29.11 54.02 22.85 65.28 66.45 
18 • ~n. by Pentagon 44.75 40.98 19.20 56.74 -119.04 63.44 64.74 
24 in. to airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
16 • 1n. to airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
30 in. and 16 in. under 
Key Bridge 49.07 47.13 -48.76 20.53 -9. 25 65.10 69.07 
24 • 1n. from Dalecarlia 46.45 44.07 28 .16 54.55 24.77 65.28 66.38 
36 in. from Dalecarlia 45.27 39.62 12.84 50.68 20 .91 63.33 62.25 
PRV at Army-Navy Dr. 46.45 44.19 29.11 54.63 24.87 65.28 66.45 
PRV at s 16th and Lynn St. 46.45 44 .19 29.11 54.63 24.87 65.28 66.45 
Gravity Three tank riser 46.45 44.19 29.11 54.63 24.87 65.28 66.45 
* ADD = average daily demand, MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, F1 = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 =National Airport fire demand, F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, F4 = Crystal Ci ty fire demand. 
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Table B7 
Pressure Indices for Roosevelt Bridge Crossing* 
Pipe Scenario ADD MDD PHD Fl F2 F3 
30 in. under Key Bridge 45 . 68 43.50 34.86 44.79 15.03 62.68 
16 in. under Key Bridge 45.74 43.61 35.19 54.25 24.35 64.11 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. Ill 36.33 26.05 -16.97 - 160.44 -185.50 53.73 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. 112 32.34 18.62 -39.03 -267.90 -290.45 50.08 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr . Ill 45.23 42.66 32.35 50.93 16.92 64.32 
16 • ~n. along Eisenhower Dr. 112 45.11 42.43 31.68 50 .41 15.29 64.16 
12 in. by Navy Annex 45.78 43.67 35.37 54 . 66 23 . 49 64 . 61 
18 in. by Pentagon 43 .98 40 . 26 25.24 57.14 -120.67 62.32 
24 in. to airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
16 in. t o airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
30 • and 16" under Key Bridge 45.37 42.91 33 . 10 34.28 4.58 59 . 84 :Ln. 
• 
* ADD = average daily demand, MDD = maximum daily demand , PHD = peak hourly demand, Fl = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 = National Airport fire demand, F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, F4 = Crystal City fire demand. 
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Table B8 
Pressure Indices for 14th Street Bridge Crossing* 
Pipe Scenario ADD MOD PHD F1 F2 F3 
30 in. under Key Bridge 45.12 42.44 31 . 72 28 .18 32.36 58.02 
16 in. under Key Bridge 46.16 44.39 37.49 57.88 47.03 64.29 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. #1 45.85 43.81 35 .79 38.64 38.54 64.52 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. f/2 45.86 43.82 35.81 36.87 38.15 64.63 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. Ill 45.99 44.08 36.57 58.00 46.50 64.88 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. 412 45.95 44.00 36.35 57.89 46.32 64.82 
12 in. by Navy Annex 46.15 44.38 37.47 59 .41 47.80 64.76 
18 in. by Pentagon 46.26 44.57 38.04 58.32 45 .48 64.91 
24 in. to airport 46.11 44.30 37.24 56.37 45.71 64.55 
16 • l.n. to airport 46.01 44.10 36.65 55.19 47.35 64 .34 
30 • and 16" under Key Bridge 42.01 36.65 14.52 -46.28 8.14 40.43 l.n. 
* ADD = average daily demand, MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, Fl = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 = National Airport fire demand, F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, F4 = Crystal City fire demand. 
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Table B9 
Pressure Indices for Booster Pump Off Low Service* 
Pipe Outage ADD MDD PHD Fl F2 F3 
30 • ~n. under Key Bridge 50.17 46.58 29.87 37.42 42.96 65.33 
16 in. under Key Bridge 48.85 46.49 36.62 62.14 50.85 67.57 
30 • ~n. along Davis Hwy. Ill 50.66 47.33 34.40 45.85 46.50 69.90 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. 112 50.96 47.59 34.27 43.96 46.25 70.20 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. Ill 48.90 46.25 35.51 62.03 50.43 68.21 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. 112 48.86 46.17 35.41 62.20 50.40 68.12 
12 in. by Navy Annex 48.82 46.40 36.70 63.22 51.26 67.82 
18 in. by Pentagon 49.82 47.26 37.10 62.49 50.24 68.79 
24 in . to airport 49.22 46.69 36.47 59.54 50.32 67.68 
16 in. to airport 48.43 45.97 36 . 06 57.65 43.32 66.78 
30 in. and 16" under Key Bridge 54.50 46.48 11.83 -26.45 27.97 54.27 
* ADD = average daily demand, MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, Fl = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 = National Airport fire demand, F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, F4 = Crystal City fire demand. 
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Table BlO 
Pressure Indices for Subaqueous River Cross ing* 
Pipe Scenario ADD MDD PHD Fl F2 F3 
30 • under Key Bridge 45.73 43.58 35.09 45.37 15.60 62.82 l.n. 
16 • under Key Bridge 45.35 42.89 33.03 49.11 19.21 62.74 l.n. 
30 • l.n. a l ong Davis Hwy • Il l 36.18 25.78 -17.78 -162.85 -187.91 53.07 
30 • along Davis Hwy • 112 32.18 18.32 -39.93 -270.47 -293.02 49.39 l.n. 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. Ill 44.97 42.17 30.90 47.49 13.48 63.43 
16 • l.n. along Eisenhower Dr. #2 44.85 41.94 30.23 46.98 11.90 63.27 
12 in. by Navy Annex 45.53 43.21 33.99 51.26 20.08 63.76 
18 • by Pentagon 43.73 39.87 24.06 53.76 -123.46 61.55 l.n. 
24 • J.n. to airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
16 • J.n. to airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
30 • J.n. and 16 in. under Key Bridge 45.44 43.04 33.50 35.58 5.68 60.12 
* ADD = average daily demand, MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, Fl = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 =National Airport fi re demand, F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, F4 = Crystal City fire demand. 
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Table Bll 
Pressure Indices for New Tank at the Navy Annex* 
Pipe Scenario ADD MDD PHD F1 F2 F3 
30 in. under Key Bridge 46.59 44.05 32.99 28.91 1.91 60.76 
16 in. under Key Bridge 46.78 44.92 37.47 56.31 27.38 65.53 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. //1 43.37 32.94 15.58 -64.98 -89.71 62.65 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. 112 40.82 33.09 1.05 -139.43 -161.94 60 . 24 
16 • 1n. along Eisenhower Dr • Ill 46.94 45.12 37.88 57.43 28.93 65.86 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. 112 46.82 44.96 37.54 56.93 58.54 65.61 
12 in. by Navy Annex 46.84 44.43 36.23 53.94 22.77 65.35 
18 in. by Pentagon 46.88 44.67 35.79 60.64 -49.65 66.11 
24 • to airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1n. 
16 in. to airport N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
and 16 30 in. • under 1n. 
Key Bridge 46.01 41.42 21.94 -21.04 -46.78 · 49.56 
* ADD = average daily demand, MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, Fl = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 = National Airport fire demand, F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, F4 = Crystal City fire demand. 
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Table B12 
Pressure Indices for Paralleling 30-in. FOWM Transmission Main* 
Pipe Outage ADD MDD PHD F1 F2 F3 
30 • under Key Bridge 41.50 35.69 11.68 - 2.94 -32.85 24.06 ~n. 
16 • ~n. under Key Bridge 44.89 42.02 30.46 49.21 19.30 53.37 
30 • ~n. along Davis Hwy. Ill 44.25 40.82 26.89 34 . 58 5.86 50.20 
30 • ~n . along Davis Hwy. 11 2 44.24 40.82 26.89 34.58 5.86 50.20 
16 • along Eisenhower Dr. Il l 44.43 41.16 27.90 46.37 12.29 52.07 1n. 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. lt2 44.30 40.92 27.21 45.90 10 . 76 51.60 
12 • by Navy Annex 44.94 42.12 30.76 49.58 18.41 53.63 ~n. 
18 • ~n. by Penta gon 34.81 38.74 20.7+ 51.40 -125.73 26.95 
24 in. to airport ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
16 • ~n. to airport ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
* ADD = aver age dail y demand, MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hour l y demand, Fl = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 = National Airpor t f ire demand, F3 = Fort Myer f i re demand, F4 = Crystal City f ire demand, 
++ = i ndicat es National Airport i s wi thout water. 
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Table Bl3 
Pressure Indices for New Airport Feed* 
Pipe Outage ADD MDD PHD F1 F2 F3 
30 in. under Key Bridge 30.38 14.96 -49.91 -180.03 -186.17 6.41 
16 in. under Key Bridge 44.94 42.11 30.72 46.42 40.16 61.58 
30 • along Davis Hwy. #1 35.73 24.94 -20.28 -165. 71 -170.95 52.15 l.U. 
30 in. along Davis Rwy. 112 31.70 17.42 -42.58 -273.13 -277.69 48.41 
16 • l.n. along Eisenhower Dr. Ill 44.79 41.84 29.94 46 . 89 39.96 62.70 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. 1!2 44 . 72 41 . 70 29.53 46.69 39.58 62.60 
12 in. by Navy Annex 45.20 42. 60 32 . 20 49.97 43.57 62.90 
18 • l.D. by Pentagon 45.15 42.50 31.91 50.67 41.35 62.85 
24 in. to airport 45.16 42.52 31.99 50.33 39.56 62.89 
16 in. to airport 45.18 42.56 32.07 50.29 41.06 62 . 91 
* ADD = average daily demand, MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, F1 = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 = National Airport fire demand, F3 = Fort Myer fire demand, F4 = Crystal City fire demand. 
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Table Bl4 
Pressure Indices for Closing 16-in. Pentagon Loop* 
Pipe Outage ADD MDD PHD Fl F2 F3 
30 in. under Key Bridge 30.18 14. 58 -51.02 -180.37 - 208. 87 6.21 
16 in. under Key Bridge 44.7 2 41. 70 29.51 46.01 16.80 61.34 
30 • l.n. along Davis Hwy. Ill 35.59 24 . 68 - 21.03 -165.37 -190. 38 52.01 
30 in. along Davis Hwy. lf2 31.59 17. 22 43.18 - 273.18 -295.59 48.21 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. ti l 44. 51 41.32 28 . 39 46.26 13.54 62.42 
16 in . along Eisenhower Dr. 112 44.41 41.13 27.83 45.97 12.42 62.29 
12 • l.n. by Navy Annex 44.99 42.21 31.03 49.52 19.38 62.69 
18 in. by Pentagon 43.13 38.74 20.74 51.20 -1 26.07 60.44 
24 in. to airport ++- ++- ++- ++- -++ 
* 
16 in. to airport ++- ++- ++ ++ -++ 
* ADD = aver age daily demand , MDD = maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, F1 = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 = Nat ional Airport fire demand, F3 = For t Myer f ire demand , F4 = Cr ystal City f i re demand, 
++ = indicates Nat ional Airport is without water. 
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Table Bl5 
Pressure Indices for New Pentagon Loop* 
Pipe Outage ADD MDD PHD F1 F2 F3 
30 in. under Key Bridge 30 . 10 l4 . 45 - 51.45 181.00 - 208 .60 6 .14 
16 • 1n. under Key Bridge 44 . 62 42.51 28.97 45 . 11 17.04 61.23 
30 • 1n. along Davis Hwy. Ill 35 . 58 24 . 66 - 21 .09 -165 . 13 - 189 . 84 52 . 01 
30 • along Davis Hwy. 112 31 . 59 17.22 - 43 .18 272.09 - 295 . 28 48 . 31 1n. 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. Ill 44 . 33 40 . 97 27 . 36 44 . 53 13.23 62 . 23 
16 in. along Eisenhower Dr. #2 44 . 23 40 . 80 26 .84 44 . 09 12.50 62.11 
12 in. by Navy Annex 44 . 90 42.04 30 . 53 48 . 34 19 . 45 62 . 60 
18 in. by Pentagon 44.68 41 .64 29.34 49 . 01 9.66 62 . 32 
24 in. t o airport ++ ++ ++ ++ 
16 in. to airport ++ ++ -H- ++ ++ 
* ADD = average daily demand, MDD =maximum daily demand, PHD = peak hourly demand, F1 = Pentagon fire 
demand, F2 =National Airport fire demand, F3 =Fort Myer fire demand, F4 = Crystal Ci t y fire demand, 
++ = indicates National Airport is without water. 
APPENDIX C: COST ESTIMATES FOR PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES 
Construction 
Category 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Table C1 
Cost Estimates for Roosevelt Bridge River Crossing 
Total 
Length 
ft 
0 
6,650 
0 
7,500 
900 
3,100 
0 
Diameter 
• ~n. 
Unit 
Cost 
$ 
Total Cost 
Thousands of Dollars 
30 
30 
30 
30 
--
140 
253 
724 
1,065 
Additional Items: None 
Subtotal 
15% Overhead 
and Profit 
Total Construction Cost 
25% Engineering, Design, 
and Administration 
Total Cost 
C3 
0 
931 
0 
1,898 
652 
3,302 
0 
0 
6,783 
1 '0 17 
7,800 
1,950 
9,750 
Construction 
Category 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Table C2 
Cost Estimates for 14th Street Bridge River Crossing 
Total 
Length 
ft 
4,270 
14,200 
0 
7,500 
900 
2,500 
0 
Diameter 
in. 
Unit 
Cost 
$ 
Total Cost 
Thousands of Dollars 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
104 
140 
253 
724 
1,065 
Additional Items: None 
Subtotal 
15% Overhead 
and Profit 
Total Construction Cost 
25% Engineering, Design, 
and Administration 
Total Cost 
C4 
444 
1,988 
0 
1,898 
652 
2,663 
0 
0 
7,645 
1,147 
8,792 
2,198 
10,990 
Construction 
Category 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Table C3 
Cost Estimates for Booster Pump Off Low Service 
Total 
Length 
ft 
4,270 
2,500 
0 
1,000 
1,000 
2,500 
0 
Diameter 
in. 
30 
30 
--
30 
30 
30 
--
Unit 
Cost 
$ 
104 
140 
253 
724 
1,065 
--
Total Cost 
Thousands of Dollars 
444 
350 
0 
253 
724 
2 ,663 
0 
Additional Items: 150-hp Booster Pumping Station 75 
1 acre land 
Subtotal 
15% Overhead 
and Profit 
Total Construction Cost 
25% Engineering, Design, 
and Administration 
Total Cost 
C5 
1,500 
6,009 
901 
6,910 
1,728 
8,638 
Construction 
Category 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Table C4 
Cost Estimates for Subaqueous River Crossing 
Total 
Length 
ft 
0 
2,300 
0 
7,500 
0 
0 
2,600 
Diameter 
in. 
Unit 
Cost 
$ 
Total Cost 
Thousands of Dollars 
30 
--
30 
--
--
30 
140 
--
253 
--
--
1,540 
Additional Items: None 
Subtotal 
15% Overhead 
and Profit 
Total Construction Cost 
25% Engineering, Design, 
and Administration 
Total Cost 
C6 
0 
322 
0 
1,898 
0 
0 
4,004 
0 
6,224 
934 
7,158 
1,790 
8,948 
• 
Construction 
Category 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Table C5 
Cost Estimates for New Tank at Navy Annex 
Total 
Length 
ft 
Diameter 
in. 
Unit 
Cost 
$ 
Total Cost 
Thousands of Dollars 
0 
1,500 16 76 
0 -- --
0 --
0 -- --
0 -- --
0 -- --
Additional Items: 1.8 MG Hydropillar 
Subtotal 
15% Overhead 
and Profit 
Total Construction Cost 
25% Engineering, Design, 
and Administration 
Total Cost 
C7 
0 
114 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1,300 
1,414 
212 
1,626 
407 
2,033 
Table C6 
Cost Estimates for Paralleling 30-in. Federally Owned Water 
Main (FOWM) Transmission Main 
Total Unit 
Construction Length Diameter Cost Total Cost 
Thousands of Dollars Category 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
ft • ln. $ 
0 --
0 --
0 --
6,000 16 148 
0 --
0 
0 --
Additional Items: Connections between 
existing 30- and 16-in. FOWM mains 
Key Bridge Connection 
George Washington Parkway Connection 
Subtotal 
15% Overhead 
and Profit 
Total Construction Cost 
25% Engineering, Design, 
and Administration 
Total Cost 
C8 
0 
0 
0 
888 
0 
0 
0 
85 
30 
1,003 
150 
1' 153 
288 
1,441 
Construction 
Category 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
5 
6 
7 
• 
Table C7 
Cost Estimates for New Airport Feed 
Total 
Length 
ft 
0 
0 
0 
1,120 
6,900 
0 
0 
0 
Diameter 
in. 
Unit 
Cost 
$ 
Total Cost 
Thousands of Dollars 
--
--
16 
24 
--
--
0 
0 
0 
148 166 
212 1,463 
0 
0 
0 
Additional Items: None 0 
Subtotal 
15% Overhead 
and Profit 
Total Construction Cost 
25% Engineering, Design, 
and Administration 
Total Cost 
C9 
1,629 
244 
1,873 
468 
2,341 
Construction 
Category 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Table C8 
Cost Estimates for Closing Pentagon Loop 
Total 
Length 
ft 
0 
0 
0 
1,120 
0 
0 
Diameter 
in. 
Unit 
Cost 
$ 
Total Cost 
Thousands of Dollars 
-- -- 0 
-- -- 0 
-- -- 0 
16 148 166 
-- 0 
-- -- 0 
0 
Additional Items: None 0 
Subtotal 166 
15% Overhead 25 
and Profit 
Total Construction Cost 191 
25% Engineering, Design, 48 
and Administration 
Total Cost 239 
ClO 
Construction 
Category 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Table C9 
Cost Estimates for New Pentagon Loop 
Total 
Length 
ft 
0 
550 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Diameter 
in. 
Unit 
Cost 
$ 
Total Cost 
Thousands of Dollars 
-- --
0 
12 68 37 
--
0 
-- --
0 
--
0 
--
0 
-- --
0 
Additional Items: None 0 
Subtotal 37 
15% Overhead 6 
and Profit 
Total Construction Cost 43 
25% Engineering, Design, 11 
and Administration 
Total Cost 54 
Cll 
